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THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE AND ITS  
GRADUATES ON THE FORMULATION OF UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN POLICY

MURRAY B. FRAZEE

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THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
AND ITS GRADUATES ON THE FORMULATION  
OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

by

Murray B. Frazee, Jr.

Submitted to the  
Faculty of the School of International Service  
of The American University  
in Partial Fulfillment of  
the Requirements for the Degree  
of  
MASTER OF ARTS





AN ABSTRACT

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The American University  
Washington, D. C.

AN ABSTRACT

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THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
AND ITS OFFICERS ON THE FORMATION  
OF MILITARY POLICY

BY

ROBERT A. FROST, JR.

Submitted to the

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of the American University

in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree

of

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August, 1952

The American University  
Washington, D. C.

## ABSTRACT

The National War College was founded in 1946 with the prediction that "its graduates will exercise a great influence on the formulation of national and foreign policy. . . ." Inquiry is made in this paper on the question of how well the College has succeeded in living up to the prediction.

Following a description of the College--its student body, faculty, facilities, and course of study--an analysis is made of the location of the graduates in relation to the power centers of foreign policy formulation. Noteworthy in this analysis is the revelation that four of the five members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thirty-one ambassadors, and many of the top career foreign service officers in the Department of State are graduates.

The answers to a questionnaire, sent to 150 graduates, are tabulated. They reveal that, by a large majority, the graduates, in addition to having served in positions in which one would expect them to have influenced foreign policy determination, consider that they did have such an influence.

The conclusion appears inescapable that the common educational experience of several hundred high and middle level decision makers is a significant element in the foreign policy formulation process.



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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

When, in 1946, a War Department Board submitted a report on future military education and first gave a concrete description of what was to become the National War College, that Board said:

The College is concerned with grand strategy and the utilization of the national resources necessary to implement that strategy. . . . Its graduates will exercise a great influence on the formulation of national and foreign policy in both peace and war. . . .<sup>1</sup>

It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to marshal facts and opinions sufficient to form a judgment on how well the College has succeeded, in its first nineteen years, in living up to the foregoing prediction. Has it had an influence on formulation of the foreign policy of the United States? If so, has the influence been of a minor nature, or has it been profound?

The search for definitive answers to these questions results in the production of much in the way of circumstantial and indirect evidence. An attempt will be

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<sup>1</sup>United States War Department, Report of War Department Military Education Board, Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow, President, cited by National War College, The National War College, Academic Year 1958-1959 (Washington: The National War College, 1958), p. 6.

## INTRODUCTION

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It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to marshal facts and opinions sufficient to form a judgment on how well the College has succeeded, in its first nine years, in living up to the foregoing prediction. Has it had an influence on formulation of the foreign policy of the United States? If so, has the influence been of a minor nature, or has it been profound?

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<sup>1</sup>United States War Department, Report of War Department Military Education Board, Lieutenant General Leonard T. Grew, President, filed by National War College, The National War College, Academic Year 1938-1939 (Washington: The National War College, 1939), p. 2.

made to show, by what is hoped to be not too tenuous a chain of reasoning, (1) what the College is and does; (2) who the graduates are, and in what government positions they have been and are currently assigned; and (3) inferentially, their past and present influence on United States foreign policy.

made in 1945, by which it is hoped to be not too far from a  
 state of equilibrium. It is what the college is and does (2)  
 and the program for, and in what government positions  
 they have been and are currently assigned, and (3) their  
 ability to be able to exert influence on United States  
 foreign policy.

The following is a list of the names of the members of the  
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## CHAPTER II

### THE COLLEGE

#### I. BACKGROUND

The National War College began operations in 1946. Its establishment had been suggested in studies initiated during 1945 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommended by several high-level survey boards.<sup>1</sup> The studies of the Joint Chiefs were begun as a result of bitter experience. During World War II, it became increasingly evident to the military leaders of the United States that no longer could the pre-1941 concept that warfare consisted of separate land and sea wars be accepted. A new major dimension, war in the air, had been added. Amphibious operations demanded the utmost in cooperation and understanding between the services. Anti-submarine warfare proved to be complex

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<sup>1</sup>The statement is derived from a document in the Classified Records section of the Library of the National War College. This document, as well as the scores of other documents consulted in this section of the College Library, are NOT security information and, hence, are not truly "classified" in the usual Department of Defense meaning. Each of these documents, however, carries a stamped prohibition against reproduction, quotation from, abstraction from, or any reference linking the document with the National War College. Much of the background and history of the College in the remainder of this chapter is derived from readings done in these documents, which cannot, in view of the foregoing, be cited more specifically.

## CHAPTER II

### THE DOCTRINE

#### 1. BACKGROUND

The National War College began operations in 1917. Its establishment had been suggested in studies initiated during 1915 by the House Select Committee on Education and the Army. The studies of the Joint Chiefs were begun as a result of bitter experience. During World War I, it became increasingly evident to the military leaders of the United States that no longer could the 1917-1918 concept of warfare consist of separate land and sea wars be conducted. A new major dimension, war in the air, had been added. Amphibious operations demanded the utmost in cooperation and understanding between the services. Anti-submarine warfare proved to be complex.

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far beyond expectations. The maintenance of logistic lines of supply, reaching to every continent and corner of the globe, required the closest coordination and rapport between representatives of the services. To a large degree, these demands and requirements were not met satisfactorily during the hostilities. The successful doctrines of amphibious warfare were not in being, except in the most rudimentary state, in 1941; and trial and error, with much of the latter, was the order of the day. The phenomenal growth of air power left many leaders in land and sea warfare far behind in understanding this giant new tool of conflict. Especially in logistics was there waste, confusion, and inefficiency--resulting, in large measure, from complete lack of sympathetic understanding of inter-service problems, as well as problems of other services.

Even more striking in the World War II experience was the emergence of politico-military problems, accompanied by an almost total lack of persons experienced or trained in solving them. The traditional military thinking had been to shy away from matters not having to do strictly with military affairs. In World War II, the circumstances of geography and the necessity for coordinating with allies all over the world posed requirements for civilians in the government service with an



the beyond expectations. The maintenance of logistic lines of supply, reaching to every continent and corner of the globe, required the closest coordination and cooperation between representatives of the services. To a large degree, these demands and requirements were not satisfied.

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Even more obvious in the World War II experience was the emergence of politico-military problems, recognized by an almost total lack of persons versed in training in solving them. The traditional military mind had been to stay away from politics and having to do

strictly with military matters. In World War II, the circumstances of geography and the necessity for coordination with allies all over the world posed requirements for civilians in the government service with an



understanding of military power, as well as senior officers of the military with the capability to plan and negotiate with civilian political leaders. One thinks immediately of General Eisenhower in conference with Prime Minister Churchill, or of Mark Clark, Jerauld Wright, and Robert Murphy going ashore together in North Africa in 1942 from a British submarine to conduct the delicate negotiations hopefully leading to non-opposition by French forces to the forthcoming Allied landings. There was little common ground of thought, little familiarity with each others' multitudinous problems, and little coordination of concept between those who formulated our foreign policies and those who were to fight to implement those policies.

As early as 1927, the British paved the way in establishing an institution for systematic study of the political, military, and economic factors affecting the national policy. The Imperial Defense College, established in London, provided such a curriculum and, more closely than any other institution, provided the model for what became the National War College.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Visit to the Imperial Defense College, March, 1962, and interviews, 1961-1962, with various officer students of the Imperial Defense College.

...as well as a number of other...  
...of the military with the capability to plan and...  
...with civilian political leaders. The...  
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...1945-1947, with various...  
...of the Imperial College.

A more immediate stimulus to the founding of the National War College, however, came from the experiences of the very early years of World War II. There had been informal pre-war discussions on the subject, but the real pressure of conflict was necessary to emphasize the requirement for inter-service understanding and knowledge. The Chief of the Army Air Forces, General Arnold, had been impressed repeatedly with the gross ignorance of his officers regarding land and sea warfare. He reasoned that what was true of his officers must apply to officers of other services with respect to air warfare. He, therefore, proposed to General Marshall and Admiral King, in 1943, that remedial action be taken. The result was the almost immediate establishment of the Army-Navy Staff College (short title: ANSCOL), with a mission to

train officers of all the arms in the exercise of command and the performance of staff duties in unified or coordinated Army and Navy Commands, [and] to develop methods and ideas for the most effective employment of all arms and services and to translate lessons learned in the field into recommended standard practice, instructions, and doctrines.

In practice, ANSCOL filled the need admirably and produced about four hundred senior officers from all the services, as well as a sprinkling of Foreign Service Officers, all of whom had been exposed to an intensive course of five months' duration. Comments of students



[illegible][illegible]

On practice, MICOI listed the need to identify and

reflected the same enthusiasm of National War College students today for the close association with officers from other services and the free interchange of ideas among students.

It is not considered necessary to treat in detail the studies and board reports of 1945 and 1946 which examined the problem of post-war military education. The Gerow Report, cited supra, actually proposed the National War College, by that name, and set out its objectives as:

1. To develop commanders for the highest echelons of the Armed Forces and key staff officers qualified to serve on their staffs;
2. To qualify officers for participation in the formulating of national policy; and
3. To foster understanding and coordination between the Armed Forces and other agencies, government and civil, which are essential to a national war effort.

It was part of the Gerow plan, however, that the National War College was to be one component college of a National Security University and that Foreign Service Officers would be trained at a State Department College within the National Security University. In the event, prospects for a State Department College were not encouraging at the time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that close cooperation between the Armed Forces and the Department of State was absolutely essential and, accordingly, invited State to participate in the National War College. The

testimony was taken continuously at National War College  
 regarding the role of the various divisions with officers  
 from other services and the four branches of the  
 Army.

It is not considered necessary to repeat in detail  
 the studies and their reports of 1944 and 1945.

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invitation was immediately and cordially accepted, and the College was launched.<sup>3</sup>

## II. STUDENT BODY

The 134 students<sup>4</sup> who are enrolled each August for the ten-month course at the National War College have very diverse backgrounds of professional and education experience. A typical recent class consisted of thirty-four Army colonels and lieutenant colonels; seven Marine Corps colonels; twenty-seven Navy captains and commanders; thirty-four Air Force colonels; one Coast Guard captain; eighteen Foreign Service Officers of Grades One, Two, and Three; three employees of the Central Intelligence Agency; three employees of the United States Information Agency; four civilian employees of the Department of Defense; and one employee each of the Bureau of the Budget, the

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<sup>3</sup>In more recent years, the Department of State has established a Foreign Service Institute, one activity of which is to conduct a one-year course called a "Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy." Seniority of the students is comparable to that of students at the National War College, and each seminar includes token numbers of military participants.

<sup>4</sup>Membership of the first nine classes showed a gradual increase in numbers from one hundred to substantially the figure quoted.

Investigation was immediately and cordially accepted, and the  
College was informed.

## II. STUDENT BODY

The first semester, which was completed each August for  
the two-month course at the National War College, gave very  
diverse backgrounds of professional and educational experi-  
ence. A typical recent class consisted of fifty-four  
Army colonels and lieutenant colonels; Army Reserve Corps  
colonels; twenty-seven Navy captains and commanders;  
fifty-four Air Force colonels; one Coast Guard captain;  
eighteen foreign service officers of various rank; two, and  
three, former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency;  
three employees of the United States Information Agency;  
four civilian employees of the Department of Defense; and  
one employee each of the Bureau of the Budget, the

In some recent years, the Department of State has  
assigned a foreign service officer, on active or  
leave, to conduct a two-year course called a "Seminar  
in Foreign Policy." Similarity of the students is  
comparable to that of students at the National War  
College, and each seminar includes spoken and written  
exercises.

Membership of the first nine classes shown in  
previous chapters is shown from one hundred to substan-  
tially the same.



National Security Agency, and the Department of Commerce.<sup>5</sup>  
The average age of the students is forty-four, with  
twenty years of Government service.<sup>6</sup>

Probably the widest variation among the students is in educational background. In the class of 1961-1962, for instance, there were eighteen members of the student body without college degrees of any kind; and, in each of the last eight classes to graduate, there have been at least nine members with education at less than the Bachelor level. At the other extreme, in the 1961-1962 class, there were three students with a Ph.D. degree, thirty-four with a degree of M.A. or M.S., and six with professional degrees in law or medicine.<sup>7</sup> In the class with which the writer is personally acquainted, that of 1958-1959, the students and their educational background included an Army colonel with a Doctor of Engineering degree from Johns Hopkins University; an Air Force colonel and command pilot whose degree was Bachelor of Science in Forestry; an Army

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<sup>5</sup> National War College, The Commandant's Annual Report, 1961-62 (Washington: The National War College, 1962), unpaginated table following p. 4. Hereafter cited as Commandant's Report 1961-62.

<sup>6</sup> National War College, National War College Statistical Data, Classes of 1947 through 1962 (Washington: The National War College, 1962).

<sup>7</sup> Commandant's Report, 1961-62, p. 4.

National Security Agency and the Department of Commerce.

The average age of the students is forty-four, with

many years of government service.

Probably the highest restriction among the students is

in educational background. In the class of 1951-1952, for

instance, there were eight students with the highest post

graduate degree received of any kind, and the rest of the

class either had a graduate degree, or had been at least

five years with education at least from the bachelor

level. At the other extreme, in the 1951-1952 class,

there were three students with a high school diploma, thirteen

with a degree of B.S. or M.S., and six with professional

degrees in law or medicine.<sup>7</sup> In the class with which the

action is personally acquainted, that of 1952-1953, the

senior and their educational backgrounds included one law

degree with a doctor of engineering degree from Johns

Hopkins University, an M.S. degree in physics and a master's

degree in physics and a master's in science in chemistry, and a

<sup>7</sup> National War College, The Commandant's Annual Report, 1951-52 (Washington, The National War College, 1952), unclassified cable covering p. 4. Another class in Commandant's Report 1951-52.

<sup>8</sup> National War College, National War College Senior Class Book, Class of 1951 (College Year 1950-51, The National War College, 1951).

<sup>9</sup> Commandant's Report, 1951-52, p. 4.

infantry colonel with Master's degrees from Yale in both International Relations and Engineering; an Army colonel who was a Doctor of Science from Carnegie Institute of Technology; and a civil servant whose only claim to higher education was that he had attended "Radio Electronics School."<sup>8</sup> Clearly, a large task of the College is to present the course in an intelligible way to these variegated products of the United States educational system, without reducing the content to the lowest common denominator.

In contrast to a civilian educational institution, the National War College has no control over selection of the students who will attend. The Joint Chiefs of Staff lay down broad guidelines, and the rest is left to personnel procedures within the services, departments, and agencies to which quotas are assigned. In most cases, formal selection boards are utilized. Favoritism in selection must be avoided, since assignment to the College as a student is a highly-sought-after and "career significant" milestone for the selectee, civilian or military.

The age and seniority of the military students have

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<sup>8</sup> National War College, Biographies of Staff, Faculty and Class Members, 1958-59 (Washington: The National War College, 1958).



literary career after working a number of years in both  
 industrial relations and engineering, an Army colonel  
 who was a member of the staff of the Carnegie Institute of  
 Technology, and a civil engineer whose only claim to literary  
 education was that he had attended "Radio Electronics  
 School." Clearly, a large part of the college is to  
 present the course in an individual way to these vari-  
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In contrast to a civilian educational institution,  
 the National War College has no control over selection of  
 the students who will attend. The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
 may have some influence, and they have left no doubt  
 and procedure within the services, departments, and  
 agencies to which passes the assignment. In some cases,  
 formal selection boards are utilized. However, in other  
 cases such as would, since assignment to the College as a  
 student is a high-priority and career assignment,  
 assistance for the student, civilian or military.  
 The age and seniority of the military students have

varied from year to year, in response to pressures and criticism from various sources. On the one hand, the desire of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the National War College be viewed as the apex of the military educational system has resulted in a requirement that a portion of the military students be graduates of the senior courses at their own war colleges.<sup>9</sup> This has delayed attendance at National War College and tended to result in increased age and seniority.<sup>10</sup>

On the other hand, the current trend in age and seniority of the military students seems to be downward. In the current class, over half the military are in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel/Commander, in contrast to five

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<sup>9</sup>The Army War College, at Carlisle, Pennsylvania; The Naval War College, at Newport, Rhode Island; The Senior Officer Course at the Marine Corps Schools Command, Quantico, Virginia; and The Air War College, a component of the Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama.

<sup>10</sup>The case for more senior students is made in a comment received, in answer to the questionnaire which is the subject of Chapter V, from an Army general officer: "I think it [the National War College course] the most intellectually maturing year of my service. The exchange of ideas, the defense of one's views in an intelligent arena, the birth of new ideas, and the pride of being a student at the National War College have, in my opinion, no equal. However, much of the value stemmed from the knowledge and experience of the students which, if the students are too young and lacking both in experience and mature wisdom, leaves an empty shell. This, I am afraid, is gradually becoming the case."

and exclusively  
10  
National war college was needed to result in increased the  
small own war colleges. This has delayed attendance at  
military schools in preparation of the armed forces in  
system was changed to a requirement that a portion of the  
college be spent at the military academy.  
Results of the study show that the National war  
college has been a success. In the war, the  
National war college was needed to result in increased the  
small own war colleges.

On the other hand, the current trend in the military is to rely on the military's own resources, rather than on the civilian population, to provide the necessary support for the military's operations. This is a significant change from the past, when the military often relied on the civilian population for support. This change is due to the fact that the military now has the capability to sustain itself for long periods of time, and it is no longer necessary for the civilian population to provide the necessary support. This is a significant change from the past, when the military often relied on the civilian population for support. This change is due to the fact that the military now has the capability to sustain itself for long periods of time, and it is no longer necessary for the civilian population to provide the necessary support.

The Navy War College at Newport, Rhode Island; The Senior Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island; The Junior Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island; The Senior Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island; The Junior Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island.

The case for more senior students is made in a comment received, in answer to the questionnaire which is the subject of Chapter V. First an Army General writes "I think it [the National War College course] has most intelligently selected what is of interest. The curriculum of those who attend is as well as an indication of them. The staff of the staff, and the guide of being a member of the National War College class. In my opinion, however, each of the various members from the knowledge and experience of the students whom, in the student are too young and lacking both in experience and mature vision, leaves me deeply still. With I am afraid, it completely ignores the fact."



years earlier, when every military graduate in the class was a Colonel/Captain.

It is difficult to form a judgment on whether the fact that a high percentage of graduates of the National War College go on to become generals, admirals, or ambassadors,<sup>11</sup> is a cause or effect relationship. Selection procedures ensure only those with the highest promotion potential will attend, but, certainly, the graduate is viewed by the leaders of his service or department as thus better qualified for duties of a higher grade. As an example, two of seven full Admirals of the Line of the Navy on active duty are graduates, as well as fourteen of thirty of the Vice Admirals, and fifty-five of one hundred seventy-eight of the Rear Admirals. This means about one third of the flag officers of the Line of the Navy are graduates, whereas not more than 10 per cent of the eligible Captains, from whom the flag officers were selected, are graduates. The figures were even better in the fiscal year 1965 selection for promotion from Captain to Rear

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<sup>11</sup>A memorandum from the Executive Officer of the College, addressed to the Commandant, dated 8 October 1954, on the subject "A Study of Graduates, 1954," offers the tentative conclusion that from one-half to three-quarters of the military graduates may expect promotion to flag or general rank. Subsequent experience tends to substantiate this conclusion.





Admiral, when twelve of twenty-eight selectees were graduates of the College.<sup>12</sup>

### III. FACULTY AND ADMINISTRATION

An original decision at the founding of the College, and one which draws considerable criticism from various quarters from time to time, is that the command responsibility for the College is shared by the three military services on a rotation basis.<sup>13</sup> A vice admiral of the Navy, a lieutenant general of the Army, and a lieutenant general of the Air Force serve three-year terms successively; and, in the summer of 1964, after eighteen years in existence, the College began a third round of this rotational procedure. Below the Commandant, three Deputy Commandants serve. Each of the two military services,

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<sup>12</sup>Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the United States Navy and Marine Corps and Reserve Officers on Active Duty, 1 January 1964, NavPers 15018 (Washington: The Government Printing Office, 1964).

<sup>13</sup>One of the most recent criticisms is a minority point of view expressed in the 1962 report of the Board of Consultants, favoring a term of years which would provide additional continuity of leadership, and expressing the view that the Commandant's position might well be filled by either a military or civilian leader. National War College, Board of Consultants Report Supplement to The Commandant's Annual Report, 1961-62 (Washington: The National War College, 1962), pp. 8-9.

...which was twice as many as the other two...  
...of the College.<sup>14</sup>

III. FACULTY AND ADMINISTRATION

An original decision at the founding of the College, and one which stands as a landmark in its history, was the decision to have a faculty of men and women. At that time, it was the common response to the question of the College's future that it should be a men's college. A vice president of the Navy, a lieutenant general of the Army, and a lieutenant general of the Air Force were three-year terms earlier in the summer of 1964, after eighteen years in education, the College began a full time of this national program. Below the command, these Deputy Commanders serve. Each of the two military services,

<sup>14</sup> Register of Commissioned and Reserve Officers of the United States Navy and Marine Corps and Reserve Officers on Active Duty, 1 January 1964, Volume 10018 (Washington: The Government Printing Office, 1964).

<sup>15</sup> One of the most recent criticisms is a minority point of view expressed in the 1963 report of the Board of Commissioners, favoring a term of years which would provide additional continuity of leadership, and suggesting the view that the Commission's position might well be filled by either a military or civilian leader. National War College, Board of Commissioners Report Submitted to the President's Council on National Security, 1963-64 (Washington: The National War College, 1963), p. 2-3.

other than that of the incumbent Commandant, is represented by a Deputy Commandant, one of whom acts as Deputy for Academic Affairs, and the other as Deputy for Military Affairs. The post of Deputy Commandant for Foreign Affairs is filled by a senior Foreign Service Officer, usually of the rank of Ambassador.

The full-time faculty consists of about twenty persons. As of June 30, 1964, there were four Army officers, five Navy officers, one Marine officer, and six Air Force officers making up the military segment of the faculty. In addition, there were two Foreign Service Officers and three civilians from the academic community in the group. An administrative staff of six military officers and about seventy-five civilians provided services and housekeeping facilities.

An undoubted weak point in the organization is the fact that there is an annual turnover of one-third to one-half of the faculty.<sup>14</sup> There are no permanent members. The military faculty members serve from two to four years; the Foreign Service Officers, two or three years; and the civilian academicians, either one or two years. Lack of

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<sup>14</sup>This is a perennial item in the annual Commandant's Report and is frequently alluded to in the report of the Board of Consultants.



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of the Board of Commanders.

continuity over a five-year period is thus complete and must be accepted as a handicap.

It should be explained here that the term "faculty" is an almost complete misnomer. In the sense that a faculty member's raison d'être is to instruct--that is, to provide information, develop concepts and demonstrate relationships--the faculty of the National War College has, in practice, never existed. As will be seen in Section V of this Chapter, the primary duty of the faculty concerns itself with administration of the curriculum.

Civilian members of the faculty come directly from colleges and universities on leave of absence. Their procurement is a recurring problem, due to reluctance of universities to release well-qualified men, as well as to reluctance of the professors themselves to interrupt their careers. A continuing and long-range program has been instituted to obtain qualified professors, centered largely on building up better relations and understanding between the War College on one hand, and deans, college officials, and faculty members of leading colleges and universities on the other.<sup>15</sup>

All of these shortcomings of the instructional

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<sup>15</sup>Commandant's Report, 1961-62, op. cit., p. 3.



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between the war college on one hand, and other college

officials, and faculty members of leading colleges and

universities on the other.<sup>12</sup>

All of these shortcomings of the instructional

<sup>12</sup> Continuity's Record, 1961-62, op. cit., p. 2.

methods have been dealt with in a recent magazine article.<sup>16</sup> Dr. Katzenbach is uniquely well qualified to comment on the National War College, since he not only is a leading educator, but has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Education and as a member of the Board of Consultants of the National War College. His criticisms of the service war college faculties is both harsh and accurate.

Annually, in April, the nine-man Board of Consultants holds its two-day meeting at the College. The Board, members of which are appointed by the Commandant for a three-year term to serve in an advisory capacity to the College, consists of distinguished officers, civil officials, educators, and business leaders.<sup>17</sup> The Board is kept informed of the progress of the year's work through the periodic receipt of the course syllabi, various College publications, and the tentative outline of the

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<sup>16</sup>Edward L. Katzenbach, "The Demotion of Professionalism at the War Colleges," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 745:34-41, March, 1965.

<sup>17</sup>For the 1961-62 academic year, the members were:  
 Mr. Hanson Baldwin;  
 General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA (Retired)  
 The Honorable Waldemar J. Gallman;  
 The Honorable Allen W. Dulles;  
 The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson;  
 Dr. Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr.;  
 The Honorable Frank Pace, Jr.;  
 General Thomas D. White, USAF (Retired); and  
 Dr. John W. Masland.





following year's work. During its actual visit, the Board confers with staff, faculty, and students and observes the College in operation. The Commandant presents a written report to the Board, which, in turn, makes a written report to the Commandant.<sup>18</sup> The latter usually concerns itself with recommendations and observations on such subjects as the faculty, facilities, curriculum, as well as on much broader subjects, such as the mission of the College.

#### IV. FACILITIES

A fair summary of the physical plant of the National War College would be that it is in pleasant surroundings, conveniently located and arranged, adequate in size, but antiquated in a number of ways. The building in which the College and all its facilities are housed is located at Fort Lesley J. McNair, in southwest Washington. Erected in 1909 as the home of the Army War College, the building was used for that purpose until 1942 and, since 1946, has housed the National War College. Certain items of modernization are needed to a considerable degree, but the annual deferment of the Commandant's requests for

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<sup>18</sup>This is not as cozy and private an arrangement as it might appear, since both documents are circulated in the Joint Staff and elsewhere.

well as on such broader subjects, such as the status of  
such subjects as the economy, political, religious, or  
concerns itself with recommendations and observations on  
written report to the Commandant.<sup>18</sup> The latter usually  
a written report to the Board, which, in turn, makes a  
review the College in relation. The Commandant, through  
Board consists with study, faculty, and students and co-  
ordinating year's work. During the school year, the

The annual report of the Commission's Executive Committee for the year 1952, which was published in 1953, contains a list of the names of the members of the Commission and of the members of the Executive Committee. The names of the members of the Commission are listed in the following order: Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Members. The names of the members of the Executive Committee are listed in the following order: Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Members. The names of the members of the Commission are listed in the following order: Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Members. The names of the members of the Executive Committee are listed in the following order: Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Members.

This is not as busy and lively as Washington DC  
it might appear. When John Kennedy was elected he  
the Joint Staff and elsewhere.



funds for such modernization has not had a crippling effect on the functioning of the College. Major improvements are being made during the 1964-1965 school year.

A very strong branch of the facilities available to the faculty and students of the College is the library. Built up since 1946 on the foundation of the Army War College library, it today consists of over three hundred thousand volumes and files of over four hundred periodicals. The services provided by the library staff are exceptional, with much skilled assistance available in preliminary research effort. With a total user population of students and faculty of about 160, there are 25 full-time library employees, 17 of whom are of professional rank. An evaluation report of the College in 1955 commented:

Ordinarily when a library's organization and management are examined, it is relatively simple to make recommendations aimed at improving service standards. . . . Arguing against this precedent and experience is the library of the National War College. A study . . . convinced the Committee that here was an unusually fine library facility, so fine and so unusual, in fact, that to view its services and resources constitutes a distinctive, new experience.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, Evaluation Report of the National War College (1955), p. 24. (Mimeographed.) Hereafter cited as MSAC Report.

There is no such organization and no such a building at-  
 tached to the foundation of the College. Major progress  
 made in this work during the 1950-1951 school year.  
 A very strong basis of the facilities available to  
 the faculty and students of the College is the library.  
 Built up since 1945 in the foundation of the Army and  
 College Library, it today contains 47,000 books housed  
 in modern columns and files of over four hundred pairs of  
 cases. The services provided by the library staff are  
 exceptional, with much skilled assistance available in  
 practically every aspect of work. With a total user popu-  
 lation of students and faculty of about 100, there are 22  
 full-time library employees, 17 of whom are of profes-  
 sional rank. An evaluation report of the College in 1952

(continued)

concluded that a library's responsibilities and services  
 must be expanded, it is relatively simple to make  
 recommendations aimed at improving service to the  
 staff. . . . Having agreed that, in general, the  
 expansion of the library of the National War Col-  
 lege is a study . . . conducted the Committee that  
 there was an essential library facility, as there  
 had no doubt, in fact, that to view the service  
 and resources considered a first-class, one would

19  
 The 1952 report was submitted to Congress and the  
 Library Committee on Education of the  
 Committee, Education Report of the National War College  
 (1952), p. 17. The report is also in the  
 Report.

## V. INSTRUCTION

Central to the inquiry on which this paper is embarked is the need for a close look at the curriculum of the College. What is being taught at the College? How is the subject matter being presented? But before examining the curriculum, it appears appropriate here to set out the Mission of the National War College, as prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

To conduct a course of study of those agencies and other military, economic, scientific, political, psychological and social factors of power potential, which are essential parts of national security, in order to enhance the preparation of selected personnel of the Armed Forces and State Department for the exercise of joint and combined high level policy, command and staff functions and for the planning of national strategy.

### Organization of the Instruction

The academic program of the College is divided into a series of courses, each of which occupies about one month of the ten-month school year. The courses, which are discussed below briefly, are under continuous, year-to-year review. The concept set out below reflects the organization of the curriculum during the 1962-1963 school year.

#### Course One. "Introduction and World Situation."

The course seeks to develop an understanding of the general features of the present world situation, with particular



## II. INTRODUCTION

Contained in the Appendix on which this paper is based is the need for a closer look at the curriculum of the College. What is being taught at the College? How is the subject being presented? The subject is being presented, as appears appropriate, in the manner of the National War College, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To conduct a course of study of these subjects and other military, economic, scientific, political, psychological and social factors of power relations, which are essential parts of national security, in order to enhance the effectiveness of national defense at the Armed Forces and State Department for the purpose of joint and combined efforts, policy, command and staff functions and for the planning of national strategy.

### Organization of the Institute

The academic program of the Institute is divided into a series of courses, each of which occupies about one month of the two-month school year. The courses which are discussed below briefly, are made compulsory, year-to-year system. The concept of the year system is the organization of the curriculum during the 1961-1962 school year.

### Course Two: Introduction and World Situation

The course seems to have an understanding of the general features of the present world situation, with particular

emphasis on those forces which pose problems to United States security. An attempt is made to identify the main forces with which United States policy must be concerned, followed by a consideration of the objectives and vital interests of the United States, of its major allies, and of the Soviet Union.

Course Two. "Factors of the National Power With Particular Reference to the United States." A study is made of the various elements of national power which underlie a nation's strength, including such tangible factors as geography, demography, government, science and technology, education and military strength, and such less tangible factors as national character, political ideology, and leadership. Special consideration is given to alliances and coalitions. A direct evaluation is made of the power position of the United States in the areas above, together with an evaluation of such additional factors as the United States economy, United States labor and management, and space technology. The United Nations Organization is studied and a trip made to its headquarters.

Course Three. "The Formulation of United States National Security Policy." The purpose of this course is to provide an understanding of the governmental machinery concerned with the development of United States national security policy, the manner in which this machinery



emphasis on basic forces which pose problems for United States security. An attempt is made to identify the main forces which United States policy must be concerned with followed by a consideration of the objectives and vital interests of the United States, as its major allies, and of the Soviet Union.

#### Course Two. "Structure of the National Power with

Particular Reference to the United States." A study is made of the various elements of national power which underlie a nation's strength, including such tangible factors as geography, demography, government, science and technology, education and military strength, and such less tangible factors as national character, political ideology, and leadership. Special consideration is given to alliances and coalitions. A general evaluation is made of the power position of the United States in the world today, together with an evaluation of such additional factors as the United States economy, United States labor and management, and space technology. The United Nations Organization is studied and a final note is made for its development.

#### Course Three. "The Formulation of United States

National Security Policy." The purpose of this course is to provide an understanding of the fundamental necessity to formulate and develop a United States national security policy. The manner in which this national

operates, and the major problems involved. Attention is directed to the role of the major components of the Executive Branch of the Government in the formulation of such policy. An examination is made of the agencies and the organizational structure through which pertinent factors are evaluated and policy recommendations advanced. The special role of military considerations in the formulation of national security policy is examined. The part played by the Legislative Branch is also considered. In this segment of the course, the relationships and interactions between the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government are brought into view. The course also includes some consideration of the United States political party system, intelligence matters, and the problem of financing national security.

Course Four. "Strategy and Warfare." The objective is to examine the application of United States national power throughout the entire spectrum of warfare. Emphasis is placed on (1) the military capabilities required to implement national security policy, and (2) the impact of science and technology on strategy. The course begins with a field trip to military establishments in the United States. The course assesses the impact of nuclear energy on United States military strategy, including consideration of the probable effects of an era of nuclear

...and for this purpose, attention is directed to the fact that the major components of the energy policy of the Government are the conservation of energy, the development of new sources of energy, and the organization of resources through which national policies are realized and policy recommendations are issued. The special role of energy considerations in the formulation of national security policy is stressed. The last chapter of the legislative branch is also considered. In this regard, the legislative and executive branches of the Government are brought into view. The energy also influences the conservation of the United States political system, international relations, and the problem of ensuring national security.

Energy Issue, Strategy and Tactics. The object of this is to examine the mission of United States national power throughout the entire history of energy. Emphasis is placed on the military possibilities related to important national security policy, and the impact of energy and technology on strategy. The energy policy with a view to energy considerations in the United States. The energy resources that impact on nuclear energy on United States military strategy, including the allocation of the production of energy at nuclear



plenty. The course also examined United States missile programs, and studies the impact of space technology on international relations. The current United States and Soviet military strategies and capabilities to cope with both general and limited war are examined in detail. Also considered are the theory and application of deterrence, the reduction and control of armaments, and such other forms of conflict as economic warfare, psychological activities, and foreign assistance.

Course Five. "The Communist States." The course is concerned with world communism and its power base, the USSR. Its purpose is to study communism and the communist states, their strengths and weaknesses, and the nature of their threat to the United States. After an examination of the theoretical foundations and operational concepts of communism, an assessment is made of the elements of communist power. The focus is first on the USSR as a world power and the leader of the communist bloc, and then turns to the European satellites, Communist China, and the international communist movement outside the Soviet bloc. Also included is an examination of internal communist subversion in the United States.

Course Six. "Free Europe and the Western Hemisphere." The course is concerned with those nations of Europe and the Americas which have allied themselves with



likely. The course also examines the impact of space technology on progress, the status and impact of space technology on international relations. The course includes studies and Soviet military strategies and capabilities to cope with such general and limited and are examined in detail. Also presented are the theory and application of deterrence, the reduction and control of armaments, and other forms of conflict in economic warfare, psychological warfare, and foreign assistance.

Course 501, "The Communist System." The course is concerned with world communism, and its power base, the USSR. The purpose is to study communism and the communist system, their strengths and weaknesses, and the results of their impact on the United States. After an examination of the theoretical foundations and operational concepts of communism, an assessment is made of the elements of communist power. The focus is first on the USSR as a world power and the leaders of the communist bloc, and then turns to the European satellite, communist China, and the international communist movement outside the Soviet bloc. Also included is an examination of internal communist subversion in the United States.

Course 502, "The USSR and the Eastern Hemisphere." The course is concerned with the status of the USSR and the Eastern Hemisphere with special emphasis on

the United States. The course covers, in part, European political parties and attitudes, European integration and economic development, the North Atlantic Alliance, NATO military strategy, and certain member nations of the Alliance. The course also covers the economic, social, and political problems of Latin America and surveys its role in the Free World. The purposes of the course are to analyze conditions in Free Europe and the Western Hemisphere, and evaluate the impact of the countries within these areas upon the foreign and national security policies of the United States.

Course Seven. "Africa and Free Asia." The purpose of this course is to study the major forces at work, and to analyze the principal problems existing in Africa and the non-communist states of Asia as a basis for formulating United States national security policy. The course evaluates the strategic, economic, and political importance of Africa, and assesses the role the region can play in international affairs. It then considers the interrelationships between the various Middle Eastern countries. The principal problems and trends that confront the states of South and Southeast Asia in their quest for political stability and economic development are investigated. The military and political factors of Free World security in the Middle East and East Asia are analyzed. Finally, a

The United States, The Soviet Union, in fact, Europe, political parties and attitudes, European integration and economic development, the North Atlantic Alliance, NATO, military strategy, and certain common notions of the Alliance. The course also covers the economic, social, and political problems of Latin America and surveys the role in the free world. The purpose of the course is to analyze conditions in free Europe and the Western Hemisphere, and evaluate the impact of the countries within these areas upon the foreign and national security policies of the United States.

Course Objectives: "Attitudes and facts." The purpose of this course is to study the major issues at work, and to analyze the political problems existing in Latin and the non-communist states of Asia as a basis for formulating United States national security policy. The course evaluates the strategic, economic, and political importance of Africa, and assesses the role the region can play in international affairs. It then considers the international strategic picture for various Middle Eastern countries. The political problems and trends that confront the states of South and Southwest Asia in their quest for political stability and economic development are investigated. The military and political aspects of these states security in the Middle East are also examined. Finally, the



comparison is made of the United States and communist policies toward the states of Afro-Asia.

Course Eight. "Overseas Studies--An Appraisal of Implementation of National Security Policy in Strategic Areas." The purpose of this course is fourfold: First, to increase the understanding and knowledge of each member of the class by affording him the opportunity to study, on the spot, political, economic, and military situations in overseas areas, with particular reference to their impact on the objectives and policies of the United States; second, to permit members of the class to observe at first hand the actual implementation of United States policy; third, upon return, to disseminate to the entire college an evaluation of current national security policy and its implementation, based on the observations made on the respective trips; and fourth, to provide first-hand knowledge of areas where communist "wars of liberation" are possible, as a basis for detailed study of counter-insurgency in Course Nine, and to utilize these evaluations in the development of national security policy and strategy in Course Ten. Each group (the class is divided into five groups, each of which visits an area of the world) is assigned major problems concerning United States national security interest in the area visited, with the task of appraising United States policy. Upon their return



Commission is made of the United States and Communist  
politics covered the issues of 1950-1951.  
... Country Study ... "Overseas Research--An Approach to  
Implementation of National Security Policy in Strategic  
Areas". The purpose of this course is to provide a  
to increase the understanding and knowledge of each member  
of the class by extending his own knowledge in study, in  
the area, political, economic, and military situations in  
overseas areas, with particular reference to their impact  
on the objectives and policies of the United States.  
second, to provide members of the class to observe as they  
have the special implementation of United States policy;  
third, upon return, to disseminate to the class college  
an evaluation of current national security policy and its  
implementation, based on the communication made on the  
respective trips; and fourth, to provide clear-headed knowl-  
edge of areas under Communist "back of liberation" are  
possible, as a basis for detailed study of countries.  
Inadequacy in Overseas Study and Analysis of these regions  
focus in the development of national security policy and  
strategy in Overseas Areas, with groups (the class is divided  
into five groups, each of which visits one area of the  
world) as assigned major countries occupying major areas  
national security interest in the area studied, with the  
task of preparing major lecture policy. Upon their return

to the College, the groups prepare and present a brief of their visit setting forth the conclusions reached as a result of experience gained during the trip.

Course Nine. "Counterinsurgency." The purpose of this course is to conduct an intensive study of the enemy strategy and tactics in promoting and conducting insurgency; to examine the capabilities of the United States and its friends for countering such insurgency; to develop policies and principles for conducting counterinsurgency operations, and the requirements of close coordination between the military and civilian agencies, both at the policy and the country team level.

Course Ten. "National Security Policy, National Strategy and Implementing Plans." The class, working now in committees, applies the work of the preceding courses to develop a national security policy and a national strategy. The course consists of two closely-related parts. In the first, the committees prepare a national security policy paper which could be a basis of a Presidential directive to departments of the Executive Branch of the Government responsible for national security matters. As a preliminary step, United States national objectives are defined. Based on this policy, in part two, the committees develop a national strategy and implementing plans and programs for the various areas of the world, and

to the College, the Group Income and Growth a part of  
 their visit being for the conditions reached in a  
 series of experiments held during the trip.  
College Visit: Documentation. The purpose of  
 this course is to conduct an intensive study of the army  
 strategy and tactics in providing and conducting operations  
 to examine the capabilities of the United States  
 and its friends for conducting such operations, to develop  
 policies and principles for conducting operations,  
 operations, and the requirements of close coordination  
 between the military and civilian agencies, both at home  
 policy and the country level.

Course Title: National Security Policy, National  
 Strategy and Implementation Plans. The course, working now  
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 years. In the first, the committee prepares a national  
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 dential directive to departments of the Executive Branch  
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 ters. As a preliminary step, United States national objec-  
 tives are defined. Based on this policy, in part two, the  
 committee develops a national strategy and implementation  
 plans and programs for the various areas of the world, and



for specific countries where insurgency is or could be a problem, or where the United States has vital strategic interests. Some of the committees are assigned the task of preparing a military strategy and military plans at the JCS level.<sup>20</sup> Consideration is given to budgetary requirements, domestic support, and governmental organization necessary to implement the national security policy and strategy.<sup>21</sup>

#### Methods of Instruction

In implementing the curriculum, much reliance is placed on lectures by visiting speakers. Because of the national importance and prestige of the National War College, it has been possible to maintain, over the years, an extremely high quality of guest lecturers. The usual day commences with a lecture, followed by an extended question period. For these presentations, well-qualified

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<sup>20</sup>The joint nature of the College is well illustrated by the details of Course Ten. Not only are military officers being mentally exercised with problems usually thought of as within the civilian purview, but here strictly military matters are being dealt with by committees, the composition of which are, on the average, one-fourth civilian.

<sup>21</sup>Details of the courses have been abridged from The National War College, 1962-63, a publication of the College prepared as an indoctrination manual for the incoming class (Washington: The National War College, 1962), pp. 15-26. Hereafter cited as NWC 1962-63.



for specific countries where leadership is so crucial as a problem, or where the United States has vital strategic interests. Some of the countries are assigned the task of preparing a military strategy and military plans at the 100 level.<sup>30</sup> Consideration is given to necessary technical, domestic support, and governmental organization necessary to implement the national security policy and strategy.<sup>31</sup>

#### Methods of Instruction

In implementing the curriculum, much reliance is placed on lectures by visiting speakers. Because of the national importance and prestige of the National War College, it has been possible to maintain, over the years, an extremely high quality of guest lecturers. The usual day commences with a lecture, followed by an extended question period. For these presentations, well-qualified

<sup>30</sup> The joint nature of the College is well illustrated by the details of Course Ten. Not only are military officers being heavily exercised with problems closely related to the civilian power, but also the civilian officers are being dealt with by the military. The composition of which are, on the average, one-fourth civilian.

<sup>31</sup> Details of the course have been published from the National War College, 1952-53, a publication of the College prepared as an instruction manual for the incoming class. Washington: The National War College, 1952, pp. 12-24. Reported cited as NWC 1952-53.

speakers are obtained, including prominent figures in public life, recognized academic specialists from this country and abroad, career diplomats, and military leaders, and a sprinkling of journalists, business executives, labor leaders, and clergymen.<sup>22</sup>

The students are expected to complete daily and weekly reading assignments, but the separate courses of the curriculum are built around the lectures, and the information and interpretations presented by the speakers most frequently form the jumping off point for subsequent discussion. Lectures are scheduled on an average of three or four days a week, and special pains are taken to insure in advance that the substance of each lecture will mesh with the daily topics on which reading has been assigned.

The greatest possible emphasis is placed on assurance to speakers that their remarks will be treated as privileged. In addition to being protected by the appropriate security classification, the speaker is repeatedly reminded that what he says will be safeguarded by the War

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<sup>22</sup>As an illustration, the following names are listed in the first two pages of the alphabetical list of lecturers at the College for the three years 1955-1958: Dean Acheson, Mohammed Ali, George Allen, Herve Alphand, Stewart Alsop, Robert Amory, Dillon Anderson, Hanson Baldwin, Samuel F. Bemis. National War College, A Three Year Record of the Courses of the National War College for the Academic Years 1955/56 to 1957/58 (Washington: National War College, 1958), Section A, pp. 1-2.





College tradition of no quotation or attribution.<sup>23</sup> As a result, some extremely frank and candid statements are heard from lecturers, especially from those in Government positions, and in response to questions from the student audience.

A truly important and significant part of the instruction is the emphasis on the committee system. The class is divided into committees of six to eight members, in such a way that each committee represents a cross section of views and experience. Committees are reconstituted periodically, with the result that each student serves as a committee chairman, and each student serves as a fellow member on a committee with most other students.

Committee problems are assigned fairly frequently during the year, mostly on an assigned basis, but occasionally as a surprise. The problems are related to the subject matter of the course being studied at the time and represent the type of problem which might well be under current consideration in various agencies of the Government. A written solution is required, but the method of approach, scope of the solution, and format are left to each group. There is no "school solution" to any

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<sup>23</sup> National War College, Information for Guest Speakers (pamphlet, The National War College, Washington, 1963).



College situation of no question or extension. As a result, some extremely long and costly statements are heard from lecturers, especially from those in Government positions, and in response to questions from the student audience.

A fairly important and significant part of the instruction is the emphasis on the committee system. The class is divided into committees of six to eight members; in such a way that each committee represents a cross-section of views and experiences. Committees are re-elected periodically, with the result that each student serves as a committee chairman, and each student serves as a liaison member on a committee with most other students. Committee problems are assigned fairly frequently during the year, mostly on an assigned basis, but occasionally as a surprise. The problems are related to the subject matter of the course being studied at the time and represent the type of problem which might be under current consideration in various agencies of the Government. A written solution is required, but the method of approach, scope of the solution, and terms are left to each group. There is no "school solution" to any

<sup>1</sup> National War College, Information for War College ( pamphlet, The National War College, Washington, 1941).

problem at the National War College, but a faculty committee selects on the basis of appropriateness and interest, certain papers for oral presentation to the entire class. Following each presentation, sufficient time is allotted to permit other committees an opportunity to challenge the conclusions of the presenting committee.<sup>24</sup>

An individual research paper is required of each student. A systematic and analytic study of some subject related to national security is followed by a paper which the College hopefully expects will measure up in quality to the standards of university graduate work. In choosing subjects, students are encouraged to select one about which their beginning knowledge is far from that of an expert. The finished papers vary widely in quality,<sup>25</sup> just as do the educational backgrounds of the students; but, in any event, the ability of the student to make critical analyses has been improved.

### Field Trips

Throughout the history of the College, field trips

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<sup>24</sup>NWC 1962-63, op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>25</sup>"The Committee read a number of the individual research study papers. They vary enormously in degrees of excellence. Some of them are clearly of master's thesis quality. Many of them are comparable to good course papers in an undergraduate institution. A few of them are clearly unacceptable by any mature standards," MSAC Report, op. cit., p. 16.





have formed an important part of the school year. Although the practice has varied from year to year, a typical class has an October trip of two days to United Nations headquarters in New York, a week in December touring military installations in the United States, and a three-week trip in March to one of five areas of the world.

The three-week trip abroad is not only one of the most enjoyable facets of the course, but actually is considered one of the most valuable. The trip is a kind of traveling seminar, and elaborate pains are taken by the College in planning and scheduling, to ensure an educational experience of value. The trip taken by the writer in 1959 was fairly typical. In Tunisia, Pakistan, India, and Israel, there was an opportunity for the members of the class to talk informally with the political head of government. In the other countries visited (Iran, Lebanon, Greece, Turkey, Sudan, and Portugal), briefings and conversations were authoritative and more than adequate. In each country, the United States Ambassador and his staff attempted, with great sincerity, to impart to the students an understanding of the country being visited.



have formed an important part of the school year. Although the practice has varied from year to year, a typical class has an October term of two days to United Nations Headquarters in New York, a week in October four- day military installations in the United States, and a three-week trip in March to one of five areas of the world. The three-week trip abroad is not only one of the most enjoyable facets of the course, but actually is considered one of the most valuable. The trip is a kind of traveling seminar, and classroom gains are taken by the College in planning and scheduling, to mention an example. The trip takes place in the winter. The trip takes place in the winter. The trip takes place in the winter. In 1959 was fairly typical. In Tunisia, Pakistan, India, and Israel, there was an opportunity for the students of the class to talk individually with the political head of government. In the other countries visited (Iraq, Lebanon, Greece, Turkey, Korea, and Portugal), students and conversations were subjective and were then reported. In each country, the United States Ambassador and his staff attempted, with great success, to report to the students an understanding of the country being visited.

## CHAPTER III

### THE LOCATION OF THE GRADUATES

There have been 2,238 graduates of this "double-domed finishing school for the elite of the senior officers corps,"<sup>1</sup> through the graduates of 1964. Of that number, about 1,700 remain in active government service.<sup>2</sup>

An effort will be made at this point to look at three activities in Washington in which are located sizable numbers of these active duty graduates. By thus precisely locating a number of graduates and by including in addition a sampling of other governmental jobs held by graduates, it is hoped that inferences and conclusions regarding their influence on foreign policy may be possible in subsequent pages.

#### Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

This Office is organized in seven divisions, below the top-ranking Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and

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<sup>1</sup>Newsweek, No. 59, March 12, 1962, p. 95.

<sup>2</sup>There were a small number of Canadian and British military officers in the first four classes. They participated fully, but had the status of "observers" and are not included in the College statistics as "graduates." It is interesting to note that twenty-one of the twenty-two "observers" have been promoted to flag or general rank. For news of the twenty-second, see infra, p. 41, n. 3.

THE LOCATION OF THE BARRACKS

There have been 2,115 graduates of this school.

Some finished school for the first of the school officers corps, through the graduates of 1954. In that number, about 1,700 remain in active government service. An effort will be made at this point to look at these activities in Washington in which are located this number of these active army graduates. By this previously located a number of graduates and by including in addition a listing of some governmental jobs held by graduates, it is hoped that interested and concerned regarding their influence on foreign policy may be possible in subsequent pages.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(International Security Affairs)

This office is organized in seven divisions, with the top-ranking Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and

Washington, D.C., March 15, 1964, p. 32.

There were a small number of Canadian and British military officers in the 1940s from Canada. They are listed fully, but not the names of "observers" and are not included in the College Application as "observers". It is interesting to note that twenty-one of the twenty-two "observers" have been included in the list of general staff for that of the twenty-second. See Large, D. H., p. 3.



his principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. In six of the seven divisions,<sup>3</sup> graduates of the College occupy prominent positions.

The Director of Military Assistance, General Robert J. Wood, USA, heads the largest division, and is himself a graduate of the College. The Deputy Director of Military Assistance for Plans and Programs, Brigadier General G. E. Pinkston, USAF, is a graduate, as is the Assistant Deputy Director, Mr. Milton H. Blick. The Plans and Analysis Branch of this Division is headed by another graduate, Captain Lodwick H. Alford, USN, and in the Programs Branch is Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hixon, USA. In addition, Mr. David W. Quant is the Chief of the Organization and Training Branch.

In the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Planning and North Atlantic Affairs), two of the three Special Project Directors are graduates, Mr. Robert S. Mandelstam and Mr. Harry Schwartz. The latter is a Foreign Service Officer on loan to Defense. Also on duty in this Division are two Project Officers of the Policy Planning Staff, Mr. Albert Toner and Colonel Laurence J. Legere, USA. In the European Branch, Brigadier General

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<sup>3</sup>Telephone Directory, OASD (ISA), undated, but printed December, 1964. (Mimeographed.)



his principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. In six of the seven divisions, graduates of the College occupy senior positions.

The Director of Military Assistance, General Robert A. Wood, USA, heads the largest division, and is himself a graduate of the College. The Deputy Director of Military Assistance for Plans and Programs, Colonel General J. E. Dinsmore, USA, is a graduate, as is the Assistant Deputy Director, Mr. Wilson B. Allen. The Plans and Analysis Branch of this division is headed by another graduate, Captain Lester W. Allen, USA, and as the Program Branch is headed by Colonel Robert Allen, USA. In addition, Mr. David A. Allen is the Chief of the Organization and Training Branch.

In the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary Planning and North Atlantic Affairs, two of the three Special Project Directors are graduates, Mr. Robert A. Anderson and Mr. Harry Anderson. The latter is a Foreign Service Officer on loan to Defense. Also on duty in this division are two Project Officers of the Policy Planning Staff, Mr. Albert Bond and Colonel Andrew J. Rogers, USA. In the European Section, Major General

J. T. Folda, Jr., USA, is Director, and Mr. William Smith is his Deputy, while Captain James G. Andrews, USN, is assistant for the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Canada. All are graduates of the College.

Under the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere, Foreign Economic Affairs, and Far East,<sup>4</sup> the Deputy Director of Foreign Economic Affairs, Mr. Charles K. Nichols, is a civilian graduate. In the Far East Directorate are located Colonel Austin L. Berry, USAF, and Captain Jon Boyes, USN.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary (NESA and MAP Policy Review), Mr. Townsend W. Hoopes, is himself a graduate, as is the Director for NESA, Brigadier General E. L. Strickland, USAF, and the Deputy Director, Mr. Jonathan D. Stoddart. Located in this Division is a Board of Consultants, composed of five retired flag or general officers. Four of these five are graduates: Lieutenant General William P. Ennis, USA (retired); Major General John M. Breit, USAF (retired); Major General R. E. Lindquist, USA (retired); and Major General J. J. O'Hara, USAF (retired).

Finally, a graduate, Colonel Joe M. Whitfield, USAF,

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<sup>4</sup>The Office of ASD (ISA) has recently been reorganized into divisions with names such as this, with the obvious intention of making most of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries have responsibilities on both a regional and a functional basis.





is serving as Military Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Africa and Foreign Military Rights), and another, Mr. Arvin Kramish, is an Assistant Director for Arms Control.

#### The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff

There are fifty-five military graduates on duty with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff. It is considered especially significant here that, of the Joint Chiefs themselves, four of the five incumbents are graduates of the College.<sup>5</sup> In the Joint Staff, the director of the staff itself, and the directors of J-1, J-3, and J-4 are graduates, as well as the deputy director of J-5.

In addition to occupying directing positions, the concentration of graduates within certain directorates is significant to this study. There are nineteen graduates in J-5 (plans and policy directorate), and twelve in J-3 (operations directorate). In contrast, only one graduate each is assigned to the sizable J-1 (personnel), J-4 (logistics), and J-6 (communications-electronics) directorates.

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<sup>5</sup>General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman, a 1950 graduate; Admiral David L. McDonald, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, a 1951 graduate; General Harold K. Johnson, USA, Chief of Staff, USA, and General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, both graduates in 1953. The Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Edwin J. Roland, is likewise a graduate, with the class of 1955.



is serving as Military Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Africa and Foreign Military Affairs), and another, Mr. David Newman, is an Assistant Director for Arms Control.

#### The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff

There are thirty-five military positions on duty with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff. It is considered especially significant here that, of the Joint Chiefs themselves, four of the five incumbents are graduates of the College.<sup>5</sup> In the Joint Staff, the Assistant for the Staff itself, and the Director of J-1, J-2, and J-4 are graduates, as well as the Deputy Director of J-3.

In addition to occupying directing positions, the concentration of graduates within certain directorates is significant to this study. There are thirteen graduates in J-2 (Plans and Policy Development), and twelve in J-3 (Operations Development). In contrast, only one graduate each is assigned to the civilian J-1 (Personnel), J-4 (Logistics), and J-6 (Communications-Electronics) directorates.

<sup>5</sup>General Louis G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman, a 1950 graduate, retired major J. Thompson, USA, Chief of Naval Operations, a 1951 graduate, General Harold K. Johnson, USA, Chief of Staff, USA, and General William H. Brown, USA, Commandant of the Marine Corps, both graduates in 1951. The Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Edwin J. Roland, is likewise a graduate, with the class of 1955.

The Department of State

The August, 1963, Department of State alphabetical telephone directory lists a total of eighty-five National War College graduates in the Washington headquarters. Of these, sixty occupy positions identifiable in the organizational portion of the directory. Below are listed, not in order of importance, some of the more significant job titles among the sixty:

Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department;

Deputy Director of the Operations Center;

Director General of the Foreign Service;

Inspector General, Foreign Service Inspection  
Corps;

Members, Policy Planning Council (two);

Director, Office of Research and Analysis, Soviet  
Bloc;

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and  
Cultural Affairs;

Executive Director, Bureau of Educational and  
Cultural Affairs;

Deputy Director, Office of North African Affairs;

Director, Office of Eastern and Southern African  
Affairs;

Director, Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs;

Director, Office of African and Malagasy Union  
Affairs;

Coordinator of Cuban Affairs;

Deputy Assistant Secretary, European Affairs;

The Department of State

The August, 1953, Department of State alphabetical reference directory lists a total of eighty-five National War College graduates in the Washington headquarters. Of these, sixty occupy positions identifiable in the organizational portion of the directory. Nine are listed, not in order of importance, some of the more significant for titles among the fifty:

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department;

Deputy Director of the Operations Center;

Director General of the Foreign Service;

Inspector General, Foreign Service Inspection

Group;

Members, Policy Planning Council (two);

Director, Office of Research and Analysis, Soviet

Block;

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and

Cultural Affairs;

Executive Director, Bureau of Educational and

Cultural Affairs;

Deputy Director, Office of North African Affairs;

Director, Office of Eastern and Southern African

Affairs;

Director, Office of East Coast and Middle Eastern

Affairs, Office of African and Asiatic Affairs;

Affairs;

Coordinator of Ocean Affairs;

Deputy Assistant Secretary, European Affairs;



Director of German Affairs;  
 Director of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs;  
 Director of Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs;  
 Deputy Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs;  
 Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern and South  
     Asian Affairs;  
 Director, Office of International Conferences;  
 Chief, Personnel Policy and Planning Staff;  
 Deputy Assistant Secretary, Economic Affairs;  
 Deputy Assistant Administrator for Politico/Military  
     Affairs (AID)

#### Other Influential Graduates

From the 1964 directory of graduates of the National War College,<sup>6</sup> the lists below have been compiled, representing a sampling of other significant positions occupied by graduates. This is merely a cross-section of the more impressive titles:

##### Military:

Military Aide to the President of the United States;  
 Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command;  
 Director of Operations, U.S. Air Force;  
 President, Naval War College;  
 Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense;

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<sup>6</sup> National War College, Directory, Staff and Graduates of the National War College, 1964 (Washington: The National War College, 1964).





Commander in Chief, Pacific;  
 Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific;  
 Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet;  
 Commanding General, Berlin;  
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;  
 Many military, naval, and air attachés; most  
 unified and specified commanders.

Diplomatic Abroad:

Ambassadors to:

Guatemala	Sweden
Chad	Afghanistan
Honduras	Libya
Uruguay	Kuwait
Dominican Republic	Central African Republic
Cambodia	Rumania
Nepal	Laos
Finland	Saudi Arabia
Korea	USSR
New Zealand	Mexico
Ecuador	Paraguay
Ceylon	Niger
Poland	Spain
Portugal	Pakistan
Turkey	Somali Republic
Yugoslavia	



Other Graduates:

Assistant Deputy Director (Policy and Plans), USIA;

Director, Berlin Task Force, USIA;

Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency;

Political Advisors to

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic;

Commander in Chief, Atlantic;

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

Commander in Chief, Southern Europe

Executive Secretary, National Security Council.



Other Organizations:

Assistant Deputy Director (Policy and Plans), DESA;

Director, World Bank, WB;

Regional Director, Central Intelligence Agency;

Political Advisor to

Japanese Allied Commander, Atlantic;

Commander in Chief, Atlantic;

Japanese Allied Commander, Pacific;

Commander in Chief, Pacific Group;

Executive Secretary, National Security Council.

## CHAPTER IV

### INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION

As was mentioned in Chapter I, much of the evidence pertaining to influence must be circumstantial. Foreign policy is of such substance that its formulation must be by accretion and accumulation, and participation of many actors.<sup>1</sup> Very rarely can it be said that a recognizable fragment of United States foreign policy was entirely formulated by a single person--and then probably only by the President.

The specific questions of who formulates foreign policy in the United States Government, and through what process the formulation is accomplished, have been asked

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<sup>1</sup>An Army general officer, serving as Deputy Chief of Staff, Unit Training and Readiness, Headquarters U.S. Continental Army Command, in answering the question on whether he felt he had had any influence on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy (see Chapter V) recognized this distinction. ". . . influence on anything is often subtle or gradual. I served as Assistant to the Chairman of the JCS in 1957-59. In assisting him in the preparation of speeches, congressional testimony, and other matters, I feel I had an influence on the formulation of his views, and through them, on the formulation of some aspects of foreign policy. I then served as Deputy G-3 of US Army Pacific, and through the development of plans for the SE Asia and Pacific areas, and comments to CinCPac feel again that I had a degree of influence on foreign policy. In my present assignment, again through development of plans for both CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE, I feel there is some influence. . . ."

## CHAPTER IV

### THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION

As was pointed out in Chapter I, much of the evidence

pertaining to influence must be circumstantial. Foreign policy is an outcome that its formulation must be by accident and coincidence, and articulation of many factors.<sup>2</sup> Very rarely can it be said that a recognition

statement of United States foreign policy was entirely formulated by a single person--and then primarily only by the President.

The specific questions of who formulates foreign policy in the United States Government, and through what process the formulation is accomplished, have been asked

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<sup>1</sup>As Army General Officer, serving as Deputy Chief of Staff, Joint Training and Education, Headquarters U.S. Continental Army Command, in answering the question as to whether he felt he had any influence on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy (see Chapter V) responded: "I believe my influence is often of a general nature. I served as Assistant to the Chairman of the JCS in 1957-58. In that position in the preparation of speeches, congressional testimony, and other matters, I feel I had an influence on the formulation of its views, and through them, on the formulation of some aspects of foreign policy. I then served as Deputy Chief of US Army Pacific, and through the development of plans for the US Army and Pacific areas, and comments on Pacific policy, I feel I had a degree of influence on foreign policy. In my present assignment, again through development of plans for both JCS and CINCPAC, I feel there is some influence."

and examined in detail many times. It is not appropriate or necessary here to attempt a detailed study of the subject. A summary is needed, however, to provide the setting in which to locate the War College graduates who are the subject of inquiry.

There can be no doubt of the pre-eminent position of the President as a leader in foreign affairs. The President has at his disposal an imposing set of powers, bestowed by the Constitution, by legislative grant, by custom and understanding, and by court decisions. He may negotiate agreements with foreign powers, recognize new states and governments, act as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, and nominate or appoint officials, to name only a few of his powers. Along with this very considerable power has come a growth of responsibility. "Responsibility in this context means basically that there is a sanctioned expectation that the President will act, must act, and has the power to act for the nation."<sup>2</sup>

Because of the subject of this paper, the not inconsiderable role of the Legislative Branch of the Government in foreign policy formulation will be disregarded. No graduate of the National War College has been

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<sup>2</sup>Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., American Foreign Policy: Formulation, Principles, and Programs (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1954), p. 183.



and examined in detail very closely. It is not appropriate or necessary here to attempt a detailed study of the subject. A summary is needed, however, to provide the setting in which to discuss the War College graduates who are now subject of inquiry.

There can be no doubt of the government position of the President as a leader in foreign affairs. The President has at his disposal an imposing set of powers, bestowed by the Constitution, by legislative grant, by custom and tradition, and by court decision. He may negotiate agreements with foreign powers, recognize new states and governments, act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and appoint or appoint officials, to name only a few of his powers. Along with this very considerable power has come a great deal of responsibility. "Responsibility in this context means liability that there is a reasonable expectation that the President will act, and act, and use the power to act for the nation."<sup>2</sup>

Because of the subject of this paper, the not inconsiderable role of the legislative branch of the government in foreign policy formulation will be discussed. The graduates of the National War College have been

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<sup>2</sup>Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Snyder, Jr., American Foreign Policy: Formulation, Initiation, and Response (New York: Albiner & Company, Inc.), p. 111.

identified in the Legislative Branch, except for several military officers engaged in legislative liaison.<sup>3</sup>

The President, as head of the Executive Branch of the Government, has literally millions of assistants. In the Executive Office of the President, the more influential centers of foreign policy decision making are probably in the National Security Council, the White House Office, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Other activities of the Executive Office with an influence in foreign policy are the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, the National Aeronautics and Space Council, the Office of Emergency Planning, the Office of Science and Technology, and the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

In the executive establishment, the Department of State is, of course, "the major single source of foreign policy decisions in the entire governmental structure."<sup>4</sup> The detailed procedure used in formulating foreign policy in the Department is too complicated<sup>5</sup> for inclusion here.

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<sup>3</sup>Although Captain John Litchfield, Royal Navy (Retired), a 1948 "observer," is a Conservative Member of Parliament for a London suburban area.

<sup>4</sup>Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy of the American People (second edition; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 64.

<sup>5</sup>For "complicated," some critics of the Department would undoubtedly prefer another word, such as "incoherent," "irrational," or "disorganized."

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<sup>1</sup>Although Captain John L. McCord, Royal Navy  
 (retired), a 1948 "Observer," is a Conservative member of  
 Parliament for a London suburban area.

<sup>2</sup>Charles O. Jackson, Jr., Foreign Policy of the  
 American People (second edition, Englewood Cliffs, New  
 Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 14.

<sup>3</sup>For "complicated," some critics of the Department  
 would undoubtedly use another word, such as "intricate,"  
 "convoluted," or "disorganized."



A paper by Charlton Ogburn, Jr., entitled "The Flow of Policymaking in the Department of State,"<sup>6</sup> gives a lively series of examples of the interplay between offices and officials of the Department.

One other executive department looms large in foreign policy making. Military considerations have, since 1945, had an increasingly important and increasingly integrated significance in foreign policy. American policy must be based in part on military judgment in today's world, and the Department of Defense has a direct share in the foreign policy process at many levels. Two centers of power in this process are most evident: the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as principal military advisors to the President, to the National Security Council, and to the Secretary of Defense; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), the functions of whose office have been likened to a "Department of State for the Pentagon."

#### I. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

From the foregoing, it may be seen that the proof

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<sup>6</sup>Charlton Ogburn, Jr., "The Flow of Policymaking in the Department of State," Appendix C to H. Field Haviland, Jr., The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1960).



A paper by Allison Brown, Jr., entitled "The Role of Policy-making in the Department of State,"<sup>6</sup> gives a lively picture of the working of the machinery between offices and officials of the Department.

The other executive department looks large in foreign policy making. Military considerations have, since 1945, not an increasingly important and increasingly integrated influence in foreign policy. American policy must be based in part on military judgment in today's world and the Department of Defense has a direct share in the foreign policy process at many levels. The present of power in our process are most evident. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as principal military advisors to the President, to the National Security Council, and to the Secretary of Defense; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), the function of whose office have been likened to a "Department of State for the Pentagon."

# I. EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT

From the foregoing, it may be seen that the power

<sup>6</sup> Allison Brown, Jr., "The Role of Policy-making in the Department of State," *Journal of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1945, 194, 1-11. The *Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1947).

of a considerable influence, as defined in this paper's title, would be much eased if the President himself, or a considerable number of his close and influential advisors in the Executive Office of the President were graduates of the College. Such, of course, is not the case. Many of those close to the President are political appointees, while many others have not had the pattern of government service from which National War College students are drawn. In spite of these factors, it is possible to identify several graduates in responsible and influential positions.

In the White House Office itself, the Military Aide to the President, Major General Chester V. Clifton, USA, is a graduate. No one would argue that his influence with the President in foreign affairs approaches that of, for instance, Mr. Bundy. The relationships between the President and his service aides, however, are personal ones;<sup>7</sup> and, depending on the desires and inclination of the incumbent President, there is a considerable possibility for significant peripheral influence by these officers.<sup>8</sup>

One position of potential extreme influence filled by a National War College graduate is that of Executive

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<sup>7</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 262-263.

<sup>8</sup>Interview with Captain Edward L. Beach, U.S. Navy, Naval Aide to the President, 1953-1957.

of a considerable influence, as shown in this paper's title, would be much more so the President himself, as a considerable number of his close and influential advisers in the Executive Office of the President were graduates of the College. Now, of course, is not the case. Many of those close to the President are political appointees. While many others have not had the pattern of government service from which National War College students are drawn. In spite of these facts, it is possible to identify some and generally in responsible and influential positions. In the White House Office itself, for instance, the President, Major General Chester W. Clifton, USA, is a graduate. He would expect that his influence with the President in foreign affairs approaches that of, for instance, Mr. Bundy. The relationship between the President and his service staff, however, are personal ones, and, depending on the nature and inclination of the incumbent President, there is a considerable possibility for significant personal influence by these officials. One position of potential extreme influence filled by a National War College graduate is that of Executive

<sup>1</sup>United States Government, Manual for Change Orders, Army, Navy and Air Force, 1957, pp. 252-253.  
<sup>2</sup>For example, see General Robert A. Brown, USA, Navy, Naval Air for President, 1953-1957.



Secretary of the National Security Council. The Honorable Bromley K. Smith attended the College under a State Department quota in 1951-1952. While it is true that the National Security Council has probably had a declining role in its intended function over the past years of the Democratic Administration, it has had in the past, and undoubtedly will have in the future, a most vital role in foreign policy. Its function is

. . . to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the National Security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.<sup>9</sup>

The Executive Secretary to a group functioning in accordance with the quoted mission, it is submitted, is truly a power center in foreign policy formulation.<sup>10</sup>

The Bureau of the Budget has participated to a very limited degree in furnishing students for the National War College. Only six of its employees have attended over the

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<sup>9</sup>Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, United States Government Organization Manual, 1963-64 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 56. Hereafter cited as G. O. Manual.

<sup>10</sup>See Burton M. Sapin, "The Organization and Procedures of the National Security Council Mechanism," which is Appendix B to H. Field Haviland, Jr., op. cit.



Secretary of the National Security Council, The Honorable  
 Richard B. Cheney, stated the College under a State Department  
 grant from 1954-1955. While it is true that the  
 National Security Council has strongly and consistently  
 role in the internal situation over the past years of the  
 democratic administration, it has not in the past, and  
 undoubtedly will have in the future, a great deal to do in  
 foreign policy. The function is

to advise the President with respect to the  
 information of domestic, foreign, and military  
 policies relating to the National Security as  
 in general and military service and the other  
 departments and agencies of the Government as  
 concerns more directly in matters involving the  
 national security.

The National Security Council is a group functioning in accordance  
 with the great mission, it is committed, in truth,  
 to power center in foreign policy formulation.

The Bureau of the Budget has participated to a very  
 large degree in formulating proposals for the National War  
 College. Only one of its employees have worked over the

Office of the Federal Register, National Archives  
 and Records Service, General Services Administration,  
 United States Government Printing Office, 1951-52  
 Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951, p. 25.  
 Director cited as G. O. Journal.

The Bureau of the Budget, The Department of the Treasury  
 and the National Security Council, Washington, D.C., 1951.  
 In Appendix I to G. O. Journal, 1951, p. 25.

years, of whom four remain in government service, and none of whom is in a top policy-making position in the Bureau. Elsewhere in the Executive Office of the President, there is a Foreign Service Officer graduate serving as Special Assistant in the Office of Science and Technology, and two other graduates serving as Special Assistants for Economic Affairs in the Office of Emergency Planning.

The imponderable in this area is the Central Intelligence Agency. The Deputy Director, Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA, is a graduate. Below his level, information is hard to get, and understandably so. The facts at hand, however, show that there have been thirty-seven CIA graduates since 1949, of whom thirty-five remain in service as of June, 1962.<sup>11</sup> One would suppose that many of these graduates hold key positions of great responsibility in the Agency, as do their service and State Department contemporaries, but unclassified information on the subject is not obtainable.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>National War College, The Commandant's Annual Report, 1961-62 (Washington: The National War College, 1962).

<sup>12</sup>It has been interesting to follow the changeable policy of the College authorities in identifying the CIA graduates in the annual Directory of Graduates. The November, 1959, Directory, in which the writer's class first appeared, listed the three CIA graduates of that class in the same format as other graduates, but gave no indication of their duties. In 1962, the Directory

years of more than 10 years in government service, and some of whom is in a key policy-making position in the Government. There are also in the Executive Office of the President, there is a foreign service officer previously serving as special assistant in the Office of Science and Technology, and two other graduates serving as technical assistants for Special Assistant to the Office of Technology Planning.

The Department is also one of the central foreign intelligence agency. The Deputy Director, Lieutenant General Marshall A. Carter, USA, is a graduate. Below his level, information is used to get, and subsequently to. The fact is that, however, some of these have been fully given his graduate since 1948, as some thirty-five remain in service as of June, 1951.<sup>12</sup> The would suggest that many of these graduates hold key positions of great responsibility in the agency, as in their service and state department organizations, and unclassified information on the subject is not available.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Marshall A. Carter, The Graduate's Journal, Report, 1941-52, Washington, The National War College, 1951.

<sup>13</sup> It has been interesting to follow the development of the College graduates in identifying the graduates in the annual reports of the Department. The November, 1951, list, is under the title of class first appeared, listed the names of graduates of that class in the same form as other graduates, but gave no indication of their status. In 1951, the Secretary



## II. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

From the examples listed in Section III of Chapter III, it may be seen that, below the level of offices held principally by political appointees, graduates of the College appear prominently. In the geographic bureaus, whose heads (Assistant Secretaries) have been referred to as "obviously key people in the flow of policy decision,"<sup>13</sup> the representation of graduates is especially heavy. Twenty-three graduates work in these five bureaus in important billets, including Deputy Assistant Secretaries in three of the bureaus.

A considerable influence of the National War College is felt in the Policy Planning Council, where the Executive Secretary and two of the members are graduates. As in the case of the National Security Council, the Policy Planning Council has been criticized for failure to

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underwent a purge, and the result was that there was no hint that any CIA employee had ever attended the National War College. In the case of the Class of 1959, this development was especially disconcerting, since the Class President was one of those who had apparently disappeared. A final twist came in November, 1964, when the Directory appeared listing only one of the three CIA graduates of the class of 1959 as a graduate, although the format of the Directory provides for continued listing of all graduates, even though retired or deceased.

<sup>13</sup>Lerche, op. cit., p. 65.



As in the case of the National Security Council, the Executive Secretary and two of the members are appointed by the President. The President also appoints the Chairman of the Council. The Council has been organized for fifteen years.

understand a judge, and the result was that there was no  
first trial and the employee was never returned to the National  
War College. In the case of the trial in 1955, this  
development was expectedly anticipated, since the trial  
proceeding was not to take place until approximately 1955.  
A final trial was to be held in 1955, when the National  
Court would take up one of the three cases presented at  
the trial in 1955 as a precedent, although the trial at  
the National Court was not anticipated at all  
at that time. Over time, the trial was anticipated.

live up to its potential,<sup>14</sup> but it retains not inconsiderable policy formulation influence.

Among America's representatives abroad, both those sponsored by the Department of State and other non-military assigned by independent agencies, such as the United States Information Service, is a strong representation of War College graduates. The thirty-one Ambassadors have been mentioned previously. In almost every mission abroad there are one or more graduates, typically serving as Deputy Chief of Mission, Counselor of Embassy, Minister Counselor, Political Counselor, or Public Affairs Officer. Admittedly, these graduates function more importantly in the field of policy implementation, but their influence in policy formulation, while more often indirect, is considerable.<sup>15</sup>

### III. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The inclusion of the military point of view in American foreign policy making has been a significant item during the past two decades. More and more, that point of

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 70; and Snyder and Furniss, op. cit., pp. 281-283.

<sup>15</sup>This conclusion is implicit in a reading of Charlton Ogburn, Jr., "The Flow of Policymaking in the Department of State," cited supra, p. 42.





view has come from the Department of Defense, rather than from the more traditional sources of the two (or three) services. In the Department of Defense, who speaks on, or has a special influence on foreign policy making?

First of all, certainly the Secretary of Defense himself and his immediate staff. He is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense, and serves as a Cabinet member, a member of the National Security Council, and a member of the North Atlantic Council. Both his principal military assistant, Major General George S. Brown, USAF, and the principal military assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Colonel Francis J. Roberts, USA, are graduates of the National War College.

Secondly, the real center of foreign policy influence within the Department of Defense is in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).<sup>16</sup> As was demonstrated in Section I of Chapter

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<sup>16</sup>His functions include: (1) monitoring Department of Defense participation in National Security Council affairs, including development, coordination, and recommendation of the positions of and the provision of staff support for the Defense member on the Council; (2) conducting such political-military planning studies as the Secretary of Defense from time to time may direct; (3) initiating appropriate actions and measures within the Department of Defense for implementing approved National Security Council policies; (4) developing and coordinating Defense positions, policies, plans, and procedures in the fields of international politico-military and foreign



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from the more traditional sources of the law (the  
services. In the Department of Defense, the focus is on  
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First of all, certainly the Secretary of Defense  
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assistant to the President in all matters relating to the  
Department of Defense, and serves as a liaison between the  
member of the National Security Council, and a member of  
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With his principal adviser,  
Assistant Secretary of Defense, George A. Brown, and the  
principal military assistant to the Deputy Secretary of  
Defense, Colonel William G. Roberts, USA, are included  
of the National War College.

Secondly, the main center of foreign policy influ-  
ence within the Department of Defense is in the office of  
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security  
Affairs).<sup>12</sup> He was designated as Section I of Chapter

<sup>12</sup>This function is included in the existing Department  
of Defense participation in National Security Council  
affairs, including development, coordination, and recom-  
mendation of the positions of the President of the  
United States for the National Security Council; (2) con-  
ducting such policy-planning studies as the  
Secretary of Defense from time to time directs; (3)  
initiating appropriate action and measures within the  
Department of Defense and implementing approved National  
Security Council policies; (4) developing and coordinating  
defense policies, plans, and procedures in the  
fields of international political-military and foreign

III, there are fifteen graduates of the College serving in this Office in responsible positions.

Third, the viewpoint of the uniformed services comes to the Secretary of Defense and thus enters the foreign policy stream, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their principal assistants, the Joint Staff. It is in these two organizations that graduates of the National War College are most numerous in proportion to the total personnel, there being fifty-seven graduates in key positions among the five to six hundred officers attached

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economic affairs, including disarmament, of interest to the Department of Defense and with respect to negotiating and monitoring of agreements with foreign governments and international organizations on military facilities, operating rights, status of forces, and other international politico-military affairs; (5) providing policy guidance, as appropriate, to Department of Defense representatives on United States missions and to international organizations and conferences; (6) developing, coordinating and establishing Department of Defense positions, plans, and procedures pertaining to the Military Assistance program, and supervising, administering, and directing the Military Assistance Program and other activities of interest to the Department of Defense under the Mutual Security Program; (7) planning, organizing, and monitoring the activities of the Military Advisory Assistance Groups, including joint United States military advisory groups and training missions insofar as they concern military assistance functions; and (8) evaluating the administration and management of approved policies and programs. In the performance of his functions, he coordinates actions, as appropriate, with the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other Department of Defense agencies having collateral or related functions, and coordinates relations between the Department of Defense and the Department of State in the field of his assigned responsibility. G. O. Manual, op. cit., pp. 134-135.

III, there are fifteen members of the College serving in this office in representative positions.

Chief, the viewpoint of the enlisted services

comes to the forefront of defense and thus enters the

foreign policy arena, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

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these two organizations that progress of the National

War College are most numerous in progress in the total

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the Department of Defense and also respect to organizing  
and conducting of operations with foreign governments and  
international organizations on military facilities,  
operating rights, access to ports, and other matters.  
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guidance, as appropriate, to Department of Defense representatives on United States missions and to international  
organizations and conferences; (3) developing, coordinating  
and evaluating Department of Defense positions, plans,  
and procedures pertaining to the military assistance program,  
and supervising, administering, and directing the  
military assistance program and other activities of interest  
to the Department of Defense under the Mutual  
Security Program; (4) planning, organizing, and monitoring  
the activities of the Military Advisory Assistance  
Group, including joint United States military advisory  
groups and related military assistance as they concern  
military assistance programs, and its associated the  
administration and management of approved policies and  
programs. In the performance of his functions, he coordinates  
action, as appropriate, with the military departments,  
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other departments of  
Defense agencies having collateral or related functions,  
and coordinates military affairs the Department of Defense  
and the Department of State in the field of his assigned  
responsibility. Major General, USA, Retired, USAF, USAF, USAF.



to the two organizations.<sup>17</sup> As to influence on foreign policy formulation, it is necessary to differentiate between two aspects of the "influence." Theoretically, the advice of the Joint Chiefs is purely professional and technical, and concerns itself only with military feasibility and/or military consequences.<sup>18</sup> If this theoretical role were strictly accurate, the Joint Chiefs, as spokesmen for the military, would have a comparatively minor role in policy making. There is a widespread belief, however, that the military voice goes much farther in the American Government. Indeed, it may be argued that military advice as it comes to the civilian policy makers should have already built into it an accounting of social, economic, and political factors.<sup>19</sup> The military graduates of the National War College would appear, at least, to be prepared, through training, for furnishing this sort of advice and functioning in this sort of role.

A word, finally, about the role of the three services themselves. All three services have specifically

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<sup>17</sup> Although the Joint Staff is limited by law to a maximum of four hundred officers, the larger number referred to results from what appears to be a variety of subterfuges employed to exceed that limit.

<sup>18</sup> Lerche, op. cit., p. 72.

<sup>19</sup> Snyder and Furniss, op. cit., p. 394.



to the two organizations.<sup>17</sup> The influence on foreign policy formulation is as necessary as it is inevitable. The two aspects of the influence, however, are not the same. The influence of the United States on the policy of the United Nations is purely professional and technical, and concerns itself only with military security.<sup>18</sup> It is this military security cooperation, however, that has been the most significant factor in the military's role in foreign policy. It is not, as is often claimed, that the military voice goes with leadership in the American Government. Indeed, it may be argued that military action as it comes to the civilian policy makers would have already been in an assumption of social, economic, and political factors.<sup>19</sup> The military's position of the United States would appear, at least, to be purely technical, though essential for maintaining the role of the United States in the world. It is not, as is often claimed, that the military voice goes with leadership in the American Government. Indeed, it may be argued that military action as it comes to the civilian policy makers would have already been in an assumption of social, economic, and political factors.<sup>20</sup> The military's position of the United States would appear, at least, to be purely technical, though essential for maintaining the role of the United States in the world.

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designated units or officers responsible for international affairs. In the Department of the Army, under the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs), the senior military officer is the Chief, International Affairs, who is a National War College graduate. The Air Staff includes an International Affairs Division, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations includes a Politico-Military Policy Division, and in each of these, several graduates hold important positions.

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Secretary of the Army (International Affairs), the  
senior military officer is the Chief, International  
Affairs, who is a National War College graduate. The staff  
includes an international affairs division, and the  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations includes a political  
affairs policy division, and in each of these, several  
positions hold important positions.

The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,  
the Department of the Air Force, the Department of the  
Interior, the Department of the Justice, the Department of  
the Education, the Department of the Health, the Department of  
the Labor, the Department of the Agriculture, the Department of  
the Commerce, the Department of the Transportation, the  
Department of the Housing and Urban Development, the  
Department of the Veterans Affairs, the Department of the  
Social Security, the Department of the Energy, the  
Department of the Environment, the Department of the  
Conservation, the Department of the Fish and Wildlife,  
the Department of the Forest Service, the Department of the  
National Park Service, the Department of the Indian Affairs,  
the Department of the Public Health Service, the Department of  
the Federal Reserve, the Department of the Federal Reserve  
System, the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank, the  
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the  
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Houston,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Miami,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of New Orleans,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Antonio,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Fort Worth,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Oklahoma City,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Tulsa,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Albuquerque,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Denver,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Salt Lake City,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Phoenix,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Portland,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Seattle,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Tacoma,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Vancouver,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Victoria,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Sydney,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Melbourne,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Auckland,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Wellington,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Christchurch,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dunedin,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Invercargill,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Napier,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Palmerston North,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Tauranga,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Whangarei,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Auckland,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Christchurch,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dunedin,  
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the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Tauranga,  
the Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Whangarei,

## CHAPTER V

### THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Having tried to show by the nature of the position currently held, how the graduates are influencing foreign policy formulation, an attempt is made to introduce opinion of the graduates as a factor leading to conclusions on degree of influence. There were 150 questionnaires<sup>1</sup> prepared and mailed to as many selected<sup>2</sup> graduates. There were replies from 107, with many of the more senior individuals proving most helpful by providing detailed answers.

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<sup>1</sup>A copy of the complete questionnaire and the forwarding letter may be seen in Appendix A.

<sup>2</sup>It was considered that a random sampling would be wasteful of the questionnaire. It is fairly obvious from the background and present positions of some graduates that they have never had any opportunity for influence in the foreign policy field. In addition, graduates of the first four classes are almost all retired, and graduates of the five most recent classes were considered too junior, on the whole, to have had much influence. Having narrowed the field to the ten years 1950-1959, inclusive, it was further determined that nineteen questionnaires per class would give an accurately representative sampling of the class (five Army, five Air Force, four Navy, one Marine Corps, and four civilians). In order to limit the total mailing to 150, the classes of 1953 and 1957 were arbitrarily eliminated, and the most junior class, 1959, was reduced to seventeen. In deciding upon individuals within each group to whom to address the questionnaire, the general rule followed was to select the most senior, on the theory that they would have had more opportunity for policy influence.



THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Having tried to show by the nature of the position currently held, how the graduates are influencing foreign policy formulation, an attempt is made to illustrate the influence of the graduates as a factor leading to certain degree of influence. There were 100 questionnaires<sup>1</sup> prepared and mailed to as many selected graduates. There were replies from 107, with many of the more senior individuals proving most helpful by providing detailed answers.

<sup>1</sup> A copy of the complete questionnaire and the following table may be seen in Appendix A.

<sup>2</sup> It was considered that a random sampling would be wasteful of the questionnaire. It is fairly obvious from the background and present positions of some graduates that they have never had any opportunity for influence in the foreign policy field. In addition, graduates of the first four classes are almost all retired, and graduates of the five most recent classes were considered too junior, on the whole, to have had much influence. Having narrowed the field to the ten years 1950-1959, inclusive, it was further determined that nineteen questionnaires per class would give an accurately representative sampling of the class (five Army, five Air Force, four Navy, one Marine Corps, and four civilians). In order to limit the total mailed to 190, the classes of 1953 and 1957 were arbitrarily eliminated, and the most junior class, 1959, was reduced to seventeen. In deciding upon individuals within each group to whom to address the questionnaire, the general rule followed was to select the most senior, on the theory that they would have had more opportunity for policy influence.

## I. THE QUESTIONS

The questionnaire, limited to one typewritten sheet to attempt to avoid intimidating the recipients, asked three principal questions, to be answered "yes" or "no." Each of the principal questions was followed up by one or two subordinate requests for elaboration. The recipient of the questionnaire was asked to identify himself and was invited to extend his answers and remarks on the reverse side of the answer sheet.

The first question went to the heart of the research effort, asking "do you feel that you are serving or have served, subsequent to attendance at the National War College, in any assignment in which you had any influence on formulation of U. S. foreign policy?"<sup>3</sup> As a follow-up to that question, the recipient was asked that, if he answered "yes," in what positions had he had an influence, and elaboration was requested.

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<sup>3</sup>The word "formulation" bothered some of those filling out the questionnaire, but it is considered, on reflection, that any substituted word would have had a similar effect. A Major General, U. S. Army, commented, "I must start off with a comment on your word 'formulation.' The way the question is phrased it would indicate that somebody formulates policy from on high and passes it on down to the guy in the field to execute. I think this picture is wrong. Actually, what happens is that ideas spring up from guys in the field carrying out policy and from other guys who review their actions. So, in my opinion, execution of policy must include elements of formulation."

# 2. THE QUESTIONS

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 idea of policy must include elements of formulation."



Almost equally crucial to the inquiry was whether the graduate, if he has had an influence, has had a different influence due to his having attended the College. Accordingly, the second question asked "if you answered yes to the first question, do you feel that your attendance at National War College made a difference in your contribution to foreign policy formulation?" If this question was answered affirmatively, the recipient was asked to describe "in what way your NWC experience made such a difference."

Finally, the question was asked "has any particular phase of the NWC course been especially helpful to you in the foreign policy field?" and "If yes, what phase?" It was hoped, in this manner, to provide a check on the answers to the second question, by pinpointing inconsistencies; but analysis of the returned questionnaires showed the answers to the third question to be of little value.

## II. THE ANSWERS

By a better than two and one-half to one ratio, those who returned the questionnaire gave an affirmative answer to whether they felt they had had an influence on formulation of U. S. foreign policy. Every one of the 107 answered that question, with 78 replying "yes" and 29, "no."



Almost equally crucial to the study was whether the graduate, if he has had an influence, has had a life-  
long influence due to his having attended the College.  
 Accordingly, the second question asked "If you answered  
yes to the first question, do you feel that your second-  
 grade at National War College made a difference in your  
 contribution to foreign policy formulation?" It this  
 question was answered affirmatively, the respondent was  
 asked to describe "in what way your NWC experience made  
 such a difference."

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## II. THE ANSWERS

By a factor three two and one-half to one ratio,  
 those who returned the questionnaires gave an affirmative  
 answer to whether they felt they had had an influence on  
 formulation of U. S. foreign policy. Every one of the 107  
 answered that question, with 76 replying "yes" and 31, "no."

In general, it is considered that the positions in which the individuals felt they had wielded some influence are plausibly cited. Some random examples listed by the graduates are: "Staff Assistant to the Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Security Council Affairs, Joint Staff, Pentagon"; "Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps"; "Chief, International Affairs, Office Secretary of the Army"; "Executive Officer to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs"; and "Ambassador to Cyprus." On the other hand, there were a few who took a narrow view of the question. A Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, reported that he had been assigned, since graduation from the College, to a Combat Command of an armored division in Germany, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the 7th Army in Germany, as a Division Commander in Korea, and as Deputy Chief of Legislative Liaison (among other positions). He followed this list of assignments with the observation, "as you can see from the above, my involvement in the formulation of foreign policy has been nil." At the other extreme, at first glance, one might question the position "Director of Military Personnel, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)" as being influential on U. S. foreign policy formulation. In the elaboration, however, this officer makes his claim

In general, it is considered that the positions in which the individuals felt they had wielded some influence are classified as follows: some random examples listed by the President are: "Staff Assistant to the Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Security Council Affairs, Joint Staff, Pentagon"; "Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Program, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps"; "Chief, International Affairs, Office Secretary of the Army"; "Executive Officer to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs"; and "Ambassador to Cyprus". On the other hand, there were a few who took a narrow view of the question. A Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army, reported that he had been assigned, since graduation from the College, to a Combat Command of an armored division in Germany, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the 7th Army in Germany, as a Division Commander in Korea, and as Deputy Chief of Legislative Liaison (among other positions). He followed this list of assignments with the observation, "as you can see from the above, my involvement in the formulation of foreign policy has been nil." At the same address, in this place, one might question the position "Director of Military Personnel, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)" as being influential in U. S. foreign policy formulation. In the election, however, this officer makes his claim



clear:

Working and helping to make policy in regard to armed forces overseas, particularly with respect to dependents overseas, flow of gold, PX and Exchange policies on overseas purchases, purchases by Armed Forces individuals and their dependents of foreign made goods, tour lengths overseas, and housing construction at overseas bases.

An answer to the first question is worthy of special comment. A retired naval officer, now Ambassador to a NATO country, listed these positions in which he had been able to exert influence on policy formulation:

1. Staff, Commander SIXTH Fleet;
2. Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe;
3. Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
4. Commander, Taiwan Defense Force;
5. Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet;
6. Commander, SIXTH Fleet;
7. Chief of Naval Operations and Member, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
8. Ambassador.

Surely, this is as imposing a set of credentials as one could expect from any graduate; but, in elaboration, the officer explained that he felt his role had been limited and indirect, but nonetheless real to a degree.

A few officers questioned went to considerable detail in spelling out the reasons behind their answers.



Class:

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An answer to the first question is worthy of special comment. A retired naval officer, now reassigned to a NATO country, listed those positions in which he had been able to exert influence on policy formulation:

1. Staff, Commander Fifth Fleet;
1. Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers (Europe);
1. Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
4. Commander, Third Marine Force;
3. Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet;
8. Commander, Sixth Fleet;
1. Chief of Naval Operations and Member, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
1. Ambassador.

Finally, this is an imposing list of appointments and one would expect from any graduate, post-graduate, the officer explained that he felt his role had been limited and indirect, not necessarily real to a degree.

A few officer questions/ want to consider in detail in spelling out his reasons behind their answers.

A Vice Admiral, USN, explained that he felt that he had had foreign policy formulation influence in two positions which he had held recently: Director of the Submarine Warfare Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; and as Director, Special Projects Office. In the latter capacity, he was in charge of development, production, and support of the POLARIS weapons system. He wrote in elaboration:

While senior naval officers are frequently charged with "implementation" of foreign policy, I believe the two positions cited did put me in a position to help "formulate" such policy. Since each is a top position in charge of a unique aspect of national defense, they put me on important inter-departmental committees and gave me access to key officials and executives in State, ACDA, and White House staff. By being able to speak up with some authority on submarine warfare, and the capabilities of the POLARIS system in deterrence, I was able to influence or assist judgments of civilian policy makers not experienced in military matters. A case in point was my membership in a State Department study group considering measures to prevent surprise attack. Appearances before ACDA, and taking top officials, including the President and the Secretary of Defense, to sea to explain the working and reliability of the POLARIS system, helped confirm their reliance on nuclear deterrence in foreign policy. As President Kennedy wrote to me after his trip, "Once one has seen the firing of a POLARIS missile, the efficacy of this system as a deterrent is not debatable."

There was near unanimity in the answers to the second question. Of the seventy-eight who felt they had had some influence on formulation of U. S. foreign policy, seventy-six further felt that attendance at the College

A Vice Admiral, USN, explained that he felt that he had had fairly policy formulation influence in two positions which he had held recently: Director of the Operations Research Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and as Director, Special Projects Office, in the Joint Staff, as well as in charge of development, production, and support of the POLARIS weapon system. He stated in addition:

While I could never claim that I was personally responsible for the "institutionalization" of POLARIS policy, I believe the two positions listed did put me in a position to help formulate such policy. Since each is a very important aspect of national defense, they put me in important inter-departmental committees and gave me access to very effective and influential people in the Navy, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Department. My being able to speak up with some authority on POLARIS system in defense, and the capabilities of the system or what I judged to be civilian policy makers not experienced in military matters. I was in a position to see my responsibility in a more important study group considering measures to prevent surprise attack. Experience with AEC, and being top officials, including the President and the Secretary of Defense, to see to explain the working and value of POLARIS system, helped convince them of POLARIS value in national defense in foreign policy. As President Kennedy wrote to me after his trip, "One has seen the firing of a POLARIS missile, the ability of this system as a deterrent is not debatable."

There was great doubt in the minds of the second question. Of the twenty-eight who felt they had had some influence on formulation of U. S. foreign policy, twenty-six further felt that experience at the College



had made a difference in their contribution, with only two expressing the opposite view.

The answer of a Brigadier General, U. S. Army, to this question seems to sum up fairly a frequently-expressed viewpoint. After answering "yes" to the first question, and citing the position of "Senior Representative, U. S. Army Standardization Group, United Kingdom," he went on to say that it was certainly a minuscule contribution to formulation of policy. His point, however, was that

. . . the NWC experience is a meaningful one in terms of increased understanding, better background, and the exchange of viewpoints and ideas. Anyone exposed to the NWC experience certainly comes away better prepared to make a contribution to foreign policy formulation - no matter how insignificant - when the time comes. Some of our graduates rise to positions where they can wield a "profound" influence in a single decision. Others, in lesser positions, may, through day to day action, have a cumulative "profound" influence.

Many of the elaborating comments were general in nature. A Foreign Service Officer commented: "It provided a better understanding of the military aspects of our foreign policy." Another said: "It disposed of the unflattering aspects of my preconceptions concerning the 'military mind.'" Many answers reflected, in general, a "broadening of horizons." A Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force, commented that the course gave him "a better knowledge of how State and Foreign Service work and think." The theme of the value of working and studying with those

had made a difference in their position, with only two  
expressing the opposite view.

The answer of a British member, Mr. Lloyd, to  
this question seems to me to be a thoroughly-satisfactory  
reply. After answering "yes" to the first question,  
and citing the position of "Senior Representative, U.S.A."  
Army Administration Group, United Kingdom," he went on to  
say that it was certainly a sincere contribution to  
formulation of policy. His point, however, was that

... the War experience is a magnificent one in terms  
of increased understanding, better background, and  
the exchange of viewpoints and ideas. Anyone exposed  
to the War experience certainly comes away with a  
wider outlook to make a contribution to foreign policy  
formation - an outlook now insignificant - when the  
time comes. Some of our greatest rise to positions  
where they can wield a "profound" influence in a  
single decision. Others, in lesser positions, may,  
through day to day action, have a cumulative "pro-  
found" influence.

Many of the supporting comments were general in  
nature. A Foreign Service Officer commented: "It pro-  
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standing of how State and Foreign Service work and think."

of different backgrounds is a recurring one here and elsewhere in the answers.

As indicated previously, the answers to the third question were of little value, in that the question failed to provoke many thoughtful answers. Only eighty-four answered the question at all, with thirty-nine saying "yes" and thirty-five "no" to whether any particular phase had been of special value in the foreign policy field. There were ten ambiguous answers.

In retrospect, the wording "has any particular phase . . . been especially valuable to you . . ." appears unfortunate, and meant different things to different people. In reviewing the returned questionnaires, the only conclusion to be derived from the answers to this question is that by far the most frequently mentioned "phase" was the opportunity afforded for learning the viewpoints of other services through the day-to-day association, seminars, group study, and committee problems.<sup>4</sup>

One specific comment of value, received from a civilian employee in the Department of Defense, praising

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<sup>4</sup>Although it cannot be argued that this "phase" is not important, see Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Demotion of Professionalism at the War Colleges," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 745:34-41, March, 1965, for the argument that students seem to get so much from fellow students principally because the faculty is so professionally inadequate.



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There were few thoughtful answers.

In response to the question "are any particular  
phases of the problem especially valuable to you . . ." appears  
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people. In reviewing the returned questionnaires, the  
only question to be derived from the answers to this  
question is that of the most frequently mentioned  
"phase" was the opportunity afforded for testing the value  
points of other services through the day-to-day adminis-  
tration, planning, group study, and committee problems.  
One specific comment of value, received from a  
division employee in the Department of Defense, pointing

Although it cannot be argued that this "phase" is  
not important, see Robert J. Kahn, "The De-  
fense of the United States at the War College," U. S. Navy  
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 14-1, March, 1938, for the  
argument that students need to get so much from their  
studies primarily because the faculty is no longer  
only instructors.

the value of the College committee problems, should be mentioned here. It provides the best specific example of the "influence" turned up by the questionnaire. He writes:

As a specific case in point, I was committee chairman for a 1952 National War College problem on India-Pakistan and Afghan-Pushtu disputes. In 1963, I spent two months in London and New Delhi coordinating U. S. and British military assistance programs for India. The former was a most useful background for the latter. Again, the Nash commitment of MAP to Germany in 1953 was developed on the basis of shared experiences with two War College classmates \_\_\_\_\_ [a Foreign Service Officer] and \_\_\_\_\_ [Army Officer]. Each of us played a significant role in its negotiation and subsequent implementation.

### III. THE COMMENTS

As the last entry on the questionnaire, there was typed in capital letters

ANY COMMENTS ON HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THE NWC COURSE IN RETROSPECT, OR ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF THE WAR COLLEGE AND FOREIGN POLICY, WILL BE WELCOMED BELOW OR ON THE REVERSE.

A considerable number accepted the invitation, with some contributing novel points of view, including some rather astringent comments.

The overall scheme of the College plan of instruction was criticized by several, but from opposite viewpoints. A senior Foreign Service Officer wrote: "My major criticism was that we were not kept on a tighter leash, because I believe many of us, including myself,

the value of the College exercises program, should be mentioned here. It provides the same specific example of the statement, turned up by the questionnaire. The writer, as a specific case in point, I was provided chairman for a 1952 National War College Council on India-Pakistan and Afghan-Russian disputes. In 1953, I spent two months in London and New Delhi coordinating U.S. and British military assistance programs for India. The former was a most useful background for the latter. Again, the War College of 1953 was developed on the basis of what happened with two War College classes (a Foreign Service Officer) and (a Navy Officer). Each of us played a significant role in its organization and subsequent publication.

III. THE COMMENTS

As the last entry on the questionnaire, there was typed in capital letters:

AND COMMENTS BY HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THE WAR COLLEGE IN RETROSPECT, ON ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE WAR COLLEGE AND FUTURE POLICY, WILL BE WELCOME EITHER ON OR THE REVERSE.

A considerable number accepted the invitation, with some doubting novel points of view, including some rather astounded comments.

The special success of the College plan of instruction was reflected by several, and from opposite viewpoints. A senior Foreign Service Officer stated: "My major criticism was that we were not able to a degree learn, because I believe most of us, including myself,



would have profited even more under a tighter disciplinary policy." In contrast to this view, there were several who expressed the thought that there was too much regimentation, with not enough time set aside for individual pursuits, especially use of the library facilities. An Ambassador wrote

I . . . continue to feel that a little more time should be allowed to the individual student to "browse" intellectually in the superb library facilities offered by the NWC. Too much of the required reading seemed padded. A little more time could have been left to mature men to seek their own channels of thought. Similarly, on field trips, briefings were ticked off on an hour-by-hour basis wherever we stopped, with a minimum of time allowed for "looking around." We felt the Joint Chiefs were afraid of criticism should they allow us any free time. A little more maturity in the management viewpoint of this aspect of a superb program seemed to be in order.

The subject of the added prestige of the graduate was commented on by several of those who filled out the questionnaire. The "snob appeal" of being a graduate of the National War College has been recognized ever since the school's inception. One Army general officer linked the prestige factor directly with influence on foreign policy:

I feel my influence has been greatly enhanced by attendance at NWC. In Europe, particularly among the senior military men in NATO commands, war college level schooling, and particularly the National War College, is a matter of prestige. Somehow, Italian, French and German officers always know every senior U. S. officer's background. I felt my opinions were respected more because I was a NWC graduate.



## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSIONS

It has been a relatively simple task to demonstrate that, in fact, graduates of the National War College do occupy positions in the United States Government hierarchy in which, by virtue of their jobs, they have a profound influence on foreign policy formulation. It appears incontestable that such graduates as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State, and the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council make a significant impress on foreign policy in its formulative stages. Likewise, we have observed that in the next one or two layers just below the top men of the Government, in jobs such as Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, in the Department of State; and Director for the European Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), the graduates are to be found in ever-increasing numbers. But, has the common experience of attendance at the National War College resulted in improved or different foreign policy due to the part played by these individual graduates? Or, would the foreign policy formulated under the influence of these individuals have been about the same, had there been no National War College?



## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSIONS

It has been a relatively simple task to demonstrate that, in fact, graduates of the National War College do occupy positions in the United States Government hierarchy in which, by virtue of their jobs, they have a profound influence on foreign policy formulation. It appears inconceivable that such graduates as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State, and the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council make a significant impact on foreign policy in the formative stages. Likewise, we have observed that in the past one or two years just before the top men of the Government, in jobs such as Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs in the Department of State and Director for the European Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), the graduates are to be found in ever-increasing numbers. And, for the common experience of attendance at the National War College resulted in improvement or dissemination of foreign policy due to the part played by these individuals' graduates. Of course, the foreign policy formulation under the influence of these individuals have been about the same, but there have been no National War College.

It is submitted that, while the proposition is not susceptible of mathematical-type proof, the fact that several hundred high and middle level decision makers in the United States Government have had this common educational experience is in itself a significant element in the foreign policy formulation process. The very nature of the National War College and its program makes such a conclusion inescapable.

The course of instruction itself plays a part. The student is exposed to a mass of information coming from a curriculum seemingly tailored to educate a foreign policy maker. The quality of the lecturers is incomparable, and the facilities for reading and writing and research are superb. It is a stimulating year for every student, as well as a leisurely year--a most welcome change of pace for many of the students whose previous experience has included a high proportion of pressure-filled positions. It is trite to say that the student gets out of the course what he puts into it, but nevertheless the statement is more true here than at most schools. With no grades, class standings, or competition of any kind, it is necessary that there be a considerable individual conscience present, preventing the year of "study" from deteriorating into a full holiday. The writer's observation is that

It is pointed out, while the proposition is not

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into a full holiday. The writer's observation is that



the vast majority of the students take full advantage of the educational opportunity.<sup>1</sup>

At least equally important with the course of instruction is the intimate association with fellow students, and the resultant sharing of experiences and viewpoints. Much work is done in committees. Social and athletic events contribute to the informal camaraderie. As a former Commandant of the College has said:

Without doubt the most distinctive element of our program is the degree to which we engender greater understanding between the civilian and military components of government, and the greater understanding gained by the military of the capability of our sister services.<sup>2</sup>

This "greater understanding" comes about largely not from formal instruction, but from ten months of close association.

Finally, a third element of influence on foreign policy exercised by the College is through the continuing

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<sup>1</sup>Answers received from a questionnaire which 102 graduates answered in 1961, reveal that the work load at the College was considered "excellent to outstanding" by 64 per cent. About 18 per cent felt that it should be increased, and only 2 per cent that it should be lightened. From an undated memo from the Director of the Department of Educational Development to the Commandant, subject: Survey of Selected Graduates of the National War College.

<sup>2</sup>Lieutenant General Thomas L. Harrold, USA (Retired), "Leadership for National Security," General Electric Forum, IV:3 (October-December, 1961), p. 14.

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<sup>1</sup>Survey received from a questionnaire which 103 graduates answered in 1961, reveals that the work done at the College was considered "excellent to outstanding" by 64 per cent. About 10 per cent felt that it should be increased, and only 2 per cent that it should be lightened. From an undated memo from the Director of the Department of Educational Development to the Commandant, subject: Survey of Selected Graduates of the National War College.

<sup>2</sup>Statement given by Thomas H. Bailey, USA (Ret.), Chief, "Leadership for National Security," General Electric Forum, VII (October-December, 1961), p. 14.

contacts among graduates after completion of the course. An annual "Directory, Staff and Graduates of the National War College" is published and mailed to every living graduate. An alumni association is sponsored by the College, and luncheons and cocktail parties of the entire group, as well as class groups, serve as a recurring focus of interest for the graduates on activities of the College.<sup>3</sup> This continual renewing of acquaintance and friendship within the group and the fostering of loyalties to the College serve to pave the way for expediting and smoothing the progress of government business at lower levels; it could be hazarded that not a working day passes that inter-service, inter-department, or inter-agency contact is not made by telephone or in person between individuals whose acquaintance is based on National War College association.

There is a considerable parallel between the concepts and aims of the College, and those of the National Security Council. Both the College and the Council came into being at about the same time, and essentially in response to the same stimulus: the realization of a dangerous discrepancy between American political commitments around the world, and American military capabilities. The

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<sup>3</sup>The graduate may often be identified by the "school tie," a cravat of maroon, blue and gray stripes.



contacts every graduate after completion of the course. An annual "Directory, Staff and Graduates of the National War College" is published and mailed to every listed graduate. An alumni association is sponsored by the College, and numerous and costly parties of the entire group, as well as class groups, serve as a recurring focus of interest for the graduates on activities of the Col-

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There is a considerable parallel between the contacts and aims of the College, and those of the National Security Council. Both the College and the Council came into being at about the same time, and essentially in response to the same stimulus: the realization of a genuine discrepancy between American political commitments around the world, and American military capabilities. The

<sup>2</sup>The graduate may often be identified by the "school tie," a clasp of red, blue and gray stripes.

National Security Council was conceived in order that security policies could be shaped which would include a true coordination of political policy and military strategy. Somewhat similarly, the requirement for a politico-military education for the preparation of selected future decision makers was behind the founding of the National War College.<sup>4</sup> Implicit in the mission of the College is the aim of developing a college of grand strategy, in which the military leaders would be given a firm grasp of today's political realities, while the foreign policy planners were acquiring a true understanding of the military facts of life.<sup>5</sup>

Given this background, this mission, and the previously seen actual functioning of the College, the graduates are having, and will continue to have, an actual, concrete influence on the formulation of U. S. foreign policy.

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<sup>4</sup>See William H. Hessler, "The National War College--A Civilian Appraisal," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 82:272-276, March, 1956.

<sup>5</sup>It is just this aspect of the National War College which Dr. Katzenbach fails to recognize adequately. His main criticism of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and National War Colleges is that they are not military service oriented. While perhaps his criticism is perfectly valid for the service War Colleges, the National War College aims at a politico-military education and has a much larger non-military proportion of students. His criticism of the faculty is certainly perceptive, however.

National Security Council was conceived in order that security policies could be shaped which would include a free coordination of political policy and military strategy. However, actually, the responsibility for a political-military education for the preparation of selected leaders decision makers was during the founding of the National War College. The National War College is the place in the history of the College in the aim of developing a college of general strategy, in which the military leaders would be given a firm grasp of today's political realities, while the foreign policy planners would acquire a firm understanding of the military facts of

later.

Given this background, this mission, and the previously seen actual functioning of the College, the grounds are obvious, and will continue to have, an actual, concrete influence on the formulation of U. S. foreign policy.

See William H. Bondar, "The National War College--A Division History," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 82:275-276, March, 1956.

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## B I B L I O G R A P H Y



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

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In view of the foregoing, the bibliographical list below may appear somewhat sparse.

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- "Directory, Staff and Graduates of the National War College (year)." Issued annually.
- "National War College Statistical Data, Classes of 1947 through 1962."
- "The Commandant's Annual Report (school year)." Issued annually. In some years, includes "The Board of Consultants Report"; in other years, the latter is issued separately.
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## D. OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Commission on Institutions of Higher Education. Evaluation Report of the National War College, 1952. (Miscellaneous.)

## A P P E N D I X



The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various committees of the Board of Directors of the American Red Cross, for the year 1917-1918. The names are arranged in alphabetical order of the surnames.

ALBANY, N. Y. - Mr. J. B. Allen, President; Mr. W. H. Allen, Vice-President; Mr. J. B. Allen, Secretary; Mr. J. B. Allen, Treasurer; Mr. J. B. Allen, Chairman of the Committee on Finance; Mr. J. B. Allen, Chairman of the Committee on Publicity; Mr. J. B. Allen, Chairman of the Committee on Education; Mr. J. B. Allen, Chairman of the Committee on Legislation; Mr. J. B. Allen, Chairman of the Committee on International Relations; Mr. J. B. Allen, Chairman of the Committee on Medical and Hospital Service; Mr. J. B. Allen, Chairman of the Committee on Nursing Service; Mr. J. B. Allen, Chairman of the Committee on Food Service; Mr. J. B. Allen, Chairman of the Committee on Clothing Service; Mr. J. B. Allen, Chairman of the Committee on Shelter Service; Mr. J. B. Allen, Chairman of the Committee on Transportation Service; Mr. J. B. Allen, Chairman of the Committee on Miscellaneous Service.

ALBANY, N. Y.

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APPENDIX A

5605 Pioneer Lane  
Sumner  
Washington, D.C. 20016

I am writing to ask your help in a research project on which I am engaged. I am a Captain, U. S. Navy, a graduate of the National War College, and assigned full time during the current year as a student in the School of International Service at The American University. I am a candidate for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations and Organization, and in satisfaction of the thesis requirement, I am writing on the subject "The Influence of The National War College and its Graduates on the Formulation of United States Foreign Policy."

As you may know, the Gerow report in 1945, which was the real genesis of the National War College, visualized that the graduates would have "a profound influence" on formulation of U. S. foreign policy. It is possible to deduce from positions which graduates have held over the years, that they must have had a considerable foreign policy influence, but I am anxious to get personal opinions from a cross section of graduates [sic] on the sort of influence they feel they have been able to exert, and especially whether they feel their influence has been affected by attendance at the College.

The faculty and administration of the National War College know of this mailing, and are interested in the answers. You may be certain that the returned questionnaires will be treated with appropriate administrative privacy.

Your assistance, in filling out and returning the enclosure as soon as convenient, will be greatly appreciated.

Very respectfully

Murray B. Frazee, Jr.  
Captain, U.S. Navy

Enclosure

APPENDIX A

1505 Pioneer Lane  
Sumner  
Washington, D.C. 20015

I am writing to ask your help in a research project on which I am engaged. I am a Captain, U. S. Navy, a graduate of the National War College, and assigned full time during the current year as a student in the School of International Service at The American University. I am a candidate for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations and Organization, and in satisfaction of the thesis requirement, I am writing on the subject "The Influence of The National War College and the Graduate on the Formulation of United States Foreign Policy."

As you may know, the above report in 1947, which was the final product of the National War College, maintained that the graduates would have "a profound influence" on the formulation of U. S. foreign policy. It is possible to deduce from positions which graduates have held over the years, that they must have had a considerable foreign policy influence, but I am anxious to get personal opinions from a cross section of graduates (sic) on the sort of influence they feel they have been able to exert, and exactly what kind of influence has been exerted by graduates of the college.

The faculty and administration of the National War College know of this writing, and are interested in the answer. You may be certain that the returned questionnaires will be treated with appropriate administrative privacy.

Very respectfully,  
in closing and enclosing the  
enclosure as soon as convenient, will be greatly appreciated.

Very respectfully

Walter H. Brown, Jr.  
Captain, U.S. Navy

Enclosure



PLEASE RETURN THIS SHEET, EVEN IF YOUR ANSWER IS NO TO  
QUESTION NO. 1.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

Military rank, FSO Grade, etc. \_\_\_\_\_

Present position \_\_\_\_\_

Duties, if not apparent from title \_\_\_\_\_

1. Do you feel that you are serving or have served, subsequent to attendance at NWC, in any assignment in which you had any influence on formulation of U. S. foreign policy? \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, in what position(s)? \_\_\_\_\_

If yes, could you please elaborate? \_\_\_\_\_

2. If you answered "yes" to the first question, do you feel that your attendance at NWC made a difference in your contribution to foreign policy formulation? \_\_\_\_\_

If yes, would you please describe in what way your NWC experience made such a difference? \_\_\_\_\_

3. Has any particular phase of the War College course been especially valuable to you in the foreign policy field: \_\_\_\_\_

If yes, what phase? \_\_\_\_\_

ANY COMMENTS ON HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THE NWC COURSE IN RETROSPECT, OR ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF THE WAR COLLEGE AND FOREIGN POLICY, WILL BE WELCOME BELOW OR ON THE REVERSE. THANK YOU.

PLEASE RETURN THIS SHEET, EVEN IF YOUR ANSWER IS NO TO

QUESTION NO. 1.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

Military rank, pay grade, etc. \_\_\_\_\_

Present position \_\_\_\_\_

Unit, if not apparent from title \_\_\_\_\_

1. Do you feel that you are trained or have served, either  
 direct or attendance at WAC, in any assignment in which  
 you had any influence on formulation of U. S. foreign  
 policy? If yes, in what position? \_\_\_\_\_

If yes, could you please elaborate? \_\_\_\_\_

2. If you answered "yes" to the first question, do you  
 feel that your attendance at WAC made a difference in  
 your contribution to foreign policy formulation? \_\_\_\_\_

If yes, would you please describe in what way your WAC  
 experience made such a difference? \_\_\_\_\_

3. Has any particular phase of the WAC College course been  
 especially valuable to you in the foreign policy field? \_\_\_\_\_

If yes, what phase? \_\_\_\_\_

ANY COMMENTS ON HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THE WAC COURSE OR ABOUT  
 THE SUBJECT OF THE WAC COURSE AND FOREIGN  
 POLICY, WILL BE WELCOME EITHER ON THE REVERSE, THANK YOU.















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The influence of the National War Colleg



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